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"Benign" Sex Discrimination: Its
Troubles and Their Cure
By LEO KANOWITZ*
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Regents ofthe
University of California v. Bakke' left the constitutional fate of race-
based "benign" discrimination unresolved. Although Bakke granted
the relief sought by the plaintiff, admission to the medical school at
University of California at Davis, benign discrimination in the racial
context was neither approved nor disapproved by a majority of the jus-
tices. Whether benign, compensatory, or preferential treatment by gov-
ernment is constitutionally permissible when it favors groups that have
been victims of past societal and legal discrimination based on race is
thus a question that will have to be determined in future cases.2
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. A.B.,
1947, College of the City of New York; J.D., 1960, University of California at Berkeley;
LL.M., 1967, J.S.D., 1969, Columbia University.
1. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
2. The Supreme Court in its most recent decision involving benign discrimination,
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 48 U.S.L.W. 4979 (1980), failed to shed new light on the question. In
Fullilove, a group of white contractors challenged the Mitchell amendment to the Public
Works Employment Act of 1977 under the equal protection aspect of the fifth amendment.
The Mitchell amendment requires 10% of each federal grant for any local public works
project to "be expended for minority business enterprises"-generally enterprises "at least
50 per centum of which [are] owned by minority group members." 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2)
(Supp. 111978). The Act defines "minority group members" as United States citizens "who
are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos and Aleuts." Id While a plu-
rality of the Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Minority Business Enterprise
program, 48 U.S.L.W. at 4991, the Court failed to reach a majority consensus as to the
proper standard for judicial review in benign discrimination cases. Chief Justice Burger,
announcing the judgment of the Court, joined by Justices White and Powell, refrained from
adopting any of the analyses articulated in cases such as Bakke, stating only that the Minor-
ity Business Enterprise "provision would survive judicial review under either 'test' articu-
lated in the several Bakke opinions." Id Concurring in the opinion, Justice Powell found
that because Congress was given the unique constitutional role of implementing the post-
Civil War amendments, it need only choose a "reasonably necessary means to effectuate its
purpose." Id. at 4997-98. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, con-
curred in the judgment reiterating the intermediate standard of review they set forth in
B'akke. Id. at 4998-99. Finally, Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented on
the grounds that the equal protection standard absolutely prohibits invidious discrimination
by government. Id. at 4999.
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By contrast, in the realm of sex discrimination, the Court has to
date approved and applied the principle of benign discrimination in at
least three cases 3 and has approved, but found reasons for not applying,
the doctrine in several others as well. 4 The thesis of this Article is that,
whatever the ultimate fate or propriety of "benign" discrimination in
the racial area, it has no place in the realm of sex discrimination. The
two phenomena differ in their legal and sociological dimensions in that
men as well as women have been historical victims of severe and perva-
sive de jure sex discrimination, whereas historically white people have
not been discriminated against because they are white. In addition, the
dual aspect of any purportedly benign discrimination, that is, its inevi-
table tendency to impose burdens, as well as to confer benefits, upon
the class it seeks to aid, is much more pronounced in the realm of sex
discrimination than in the area of racial discrimination.
Elimination of the benign discrimination doctrine in the sex bias
area would be consistent with the intended effect of the proposed equal
rights amendment to the Federal Constitution,5 as that intention is set
3. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498
(1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). See also Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1908), for earlier approval and application of the benign discrimination principle in the
context of a due process, rather than an equal protection, challenge to a statute that prohib-
ited overtime work (no more than ten hours a day) for women, but not for men.
4. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Wein-
berger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). Cf. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256 (1979) (absolute preference for veterans for civil service jobs held constitutional).
See text accompanying notes 115-21 infra for a discussion of the pro-male benign discrimi-
nation implication in the dissenting opinion of Justices Marshall and Brennan in Feeney.
5. The proposed equal rights amendment provides:
"Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex.
"Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.
"Section 3. The Amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification."
Congress adopted the joint resolution proposing the equal rights amendment to the Federal
Constitution on March 22, 1972 and set a seven-year limit within which the necessary thirty-
eight state legislative ratifications were to have occurred. See S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972); H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972). By the middle of 1978,
only 35 states had ratified the amendment, and among those, several had purported to re-
scind their earlier ratifications. See Kanowitz & Klinger, Can A State Rescind Its Equal
Rights Amendment Ratiocation: Who Decides and How?, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 979 (1977).
When it became apparent that the necessary 38 ratifications would not be forthcoming by
the original deadline, Congress, in 1978, extended the deadline by an additional 39 months
until July, 1982. See Note, The Amending Process.- Extending the Ratilcation Deadline of the
Proposed Equal Rights Amendment, 10 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 91, 94 n.l 1(1978). Why the equal
rights amendment failed to achieve ratification within the original seven-year period that
Congress had prescribed, and the difficulties that ratification efforts are likely to encounter
during the extended period, are examined in Kanowitz, The ERA: The Task Ahead, 6 HAS-
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forth by the amendment's most authoritative doctrinal supporters. 6 In
addition, disapproval of sex-based benign discrimination need not de-
prive women of many of the special benefits they might enjoy under
present or future law; it could, in most cases, simply mean that men too
would enjoy those same benefits.
The dual aspect of laws that purport to accord preferential treat-
ment to women often arises only because those laws do not apply to
men as well. The mechanics of this dual aspect of "benignly" discrimi-
natory laws will also be examined in this Article. Once these mechan-
ics are understood, it will become clear that courts as well as
legislatures can be faithful to the principle of equal treatment without
regard to sex while preserving for women the benefits they may derive
from laws designed to grant them benign or preferential treatment.
One way courts can do this is through judicial restructuring of a statu-
tory scheme, a device impliedly approved for use in appropriate cir-
cumstances by the United States Supreme Court in the recent case of
Caiffano v. Westcott.7
The Evolution and Scope of the Sex-Based Benign
Discrimination Doctrine
In 1971, the United States Supreme Court, in Reed v. Reed,8 inval-
idated as a violation of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
guarantee an Idaho statute that preferred males over similarly situated
females for appointment as administrators of decedents' estates. Al-
though purporting to apply the "any-rational-basis" test that it long
had applied in sex discrimination cases, the Court, both in its result and
in some of its language,9 left the strong impression that it was applying
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 637 (1979). The possibility that the ERA may not be ratified suggests the
desirability of a closer look at whether some of the intended aims of the ERA, see note 6
ina, such as the elimination of the benign sex discrimination doctrine, can be achieved
within the existing constitutional framework.
6. "[W]hile classification by race would be 'suspect,' it is not totaUy prohibited. And
where the courts determine that the purpose of the differentiation is to benefit members of
the minority race, rather than to impose a status of inferiority, they are likely to find there
are 'compelling reasons' for the special treatment. Such an approach would not bepermissible
under the Equal Rights Amendment. "Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights
Amendment: .4 Constitutional Basisfor Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 904
(1971) (emphasis added).
7. 443 U.S. 76 (1979). The Court, however, found the circumstances to be inappropri-
ate for judicial restructuring in the Westcoatt case itself. See notes 194-206 & accompanying
text infra.
8. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
9. "The Equal Protection Clause . . .[denies] to States the power to legislate that
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a more stringent standard in judging this sex-based classification than
any of the standards it had applied in the past. ' 0
By 1976, a majority of the Court in Craig v. Boren, striking down
an Oklahoma statute that appeared to favor females over males,' 2
openly acknowledged that a more demanding test was indeed to be
applied to sex-based classifications challenged on equal protection
grounds.' 3 Since Craig, "[tlo withstand constitutional challenge, ...
classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to achievement of these objectives."'' 4
The Craig test often is described as an "intermediate test,"'I5 lying
between the traditional rational basis test of earlier cases and an "over-
whelming interest" test, long sought by sex-equality advocates, under
which sex-based classifications could pass muster only if they were nec-
essary to implement overwhelming or compelling governmental inter-
ests. Such a test has been applied when the interest being infringed by
the classification is regarded by the Court as "fundamental" or when
the classification itself is regarded as "suspect."' 6 The Supreme Court
to date has held that classifications based on race, 17 national origin,' 8
different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the
basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute." Id at 75-76.
10. The major pre-Reed sex classification cases were Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57
(1961) (equal protection is not violated by a statute permitting women to serve on juries only
if they volunteer, but requiring men to serve unless they have a recognized excuse); Goesaert
v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (equal protection is not violated by a state statute limiting the
right of women to work as bartenders to the wives and daughters of the bar owners); Muller
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (a maximum-hours law for women, but not for men, does not
violate the fourteenth amendment's due process guarantee). For criticism of the Court's
decisions in these cases, see L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION passim (1969) [hereinafter cited as KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW].
11. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
12. OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, §§ 241, 245 (1958 & Supp. 1976), prohibited the sale of 3.2%
beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18.
13. 429 U.S. at 197. This more demanding test is to be applied under either the four-
teenth amendment's equal protection clause or the equal protection aspect of the fifth
amendment. Cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (applying fifth amendment due
process to prohibit racial segregation in District of Columbia schools where equal protection
clause would apply against states).
14. 429 U.S. at 197 (emphasis added).
15. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 218 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Cf. Stan-
ton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17 (1975) ("under any test-compelling state interest, or rational
basis, or something in between--§ 15-2-1, in the context of child support, does not survive an
equal protection attack") (emphasis added).
16. See generally Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065
(1969).
17. See e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
18. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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and alienage 9 are "suspect."
Despite strong efforts by litigants challenging official sex discrimi-
nation in recent years, they have been unable to convince a Court ma-
jority to adopt the "suspect" characterization for sex-based
classifications. The closest these litigants have come was in Frontiero v.
Richardson,20 a 1973 case decided after Reed and before Craig. In
Fron'iero, four members of the Court opined that sex is a suspect clas-
sification because, like race, national origin, and alienage, it is an "im-
mutable" characteristic and "frequently bears no relation to ability to
perform or contribute to society,"' 21 so that statutory distinctions based
upon sex often have an "invidious" effect.22 Four members of the
Court do not a majority make. But because four other justices con-
curred in the judgment on other grounds, Frontiero struck down, as a
violation of the equal protection aspect of fifth amendment due proc-
ess, a federal law that granted greater dependents' benefits to male
members of the Army than to female members.2
3
Less than one year after the Frontiero decision, the Court decided
Kahn v. Shevin,24 the first modern 25 case to approve the benign dis-
19. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). But see Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S.
291 (1978), which applied a "rational relationship" test to uphold New York's exclusion of
aliens from appointment as state troopers.
20. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
21. Id at 686.
22. Id at 686-87. A holding substantially similar to the Frontiero plurality opinion had
been rendered two years earlier, under the equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment and the California Constitution, inter ala, by the California Supreme Court in Sail'er
Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971). The California court cited
essentially the same reasons as the Frontiero plurality did two years later for holding sex to
be a suspect classification. Sail'er Inn is marred by its confused conclusion that "sexual
classifications are properly treated as suspect, particularly when those classifications are
made with respect to a fundamental interest such as employment." 5 Cal. 3d at 20, 485 P.2d
at 541, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 341. Classifications are either suspect or they are not. That a classifi-
cation is made with respect to a fundamental interest may be an alternative reason for trig-
gering the overwhelming interest test, see text accompanying note 16 supra, but it should not
have any bearing on whether the classification is suspect.
23. Under 37 U.S.C. § 403 (1976), a member of the uniformed services with dependents
was entitled to an increased "basic allowance for quarters" and, under 10 U.S.C. § 1076
(1976), a member's dependents were provided comprehensive medical and dental care. A
serviceman could claim his wife as a "dependent" without regard to whether she was in fact
dependent upon him for any part of her support. 37 U.S.C. § 401(1) (1976); 10 U.S.C.
§ 1072(2)(A) (1976). A servicewoman could not claim her husband as a "dependent" under
these programs unless he was in fact dependent upon her for over one-half of his support.
37 U.S.C. § 401 (repealed by Act of July 3, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-64, § 103(2), 87 Stat. 147; 10
U.S.C. § 1072(2)(C) (1976)).
24. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
25. Cf. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (earlier decision addressing application
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crimination principle in the sex discrimination area. In Kahn, a wid-
ower challenged as an equal protection violation a Florida statute
granting widows, but not widowers, a $500 annual property tax exemp-
tion. Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas, who had on the previ-
ous day strongly rejected the notion of benign discrimination in a racial
context, 26 held that this patently sex-based discrimination was permis-
sible under what appeared to be a "rational basis" standard.27 Justice
Douglas and the five other members of the majority believed that the
Florida legislature had been aware of the generally lower economic op-
portunities available to women than those available to men when it
enacted the statute and had designed the tax preference to compensate
widows for such past and present societal discrimination. In Justice
Douglas' words:
There can be no dispute that the financial difficulties confronting the
lone woman in Florida or in any other State exceed those facing the
man. Whether from overt discrimination or from the socialization
process of a male-dominated culture, the job market is inhospitable
to the woman seeking any but the lowest paid jobs.28
Subsequently, in Schlesinger v. Ballard,29 the Court applied the
same principle to uphold a federal statute that permitted women naval
officers to remain in the Navy longer than men without being pro-
moted.30 This preferential treatment, concluded the Court in a five to
four decision, was designed by Congress to compensate women naval
officers for their reduced opportunity to demonstrate their competence
as a result of being excluded from sea duty3 '-an exclusion not chal-
lenged by any of the litigants in the case. 32 In Cal!fano v. Webster,33
of benign discrimination principle in the context of a due process challenge). Muller is dis-
cussed at note 3 supra.
26. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 336 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Itihere is
no constitutional right for any race to be preferred").
27. "There can be no doubt, therefore, that Florida's differring treatment of widows
and widowers ' "rest[s] upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation .... 416 U.S. at 355 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76
(1971)) (brackets by the Court). But see text accompanying notes 14-15 supra, suggesting
that similar language in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), later was construed as creating
an "intermediate" test.
28. 416 U.S. at 353 (emphasis added). Since Justice Douglas did not identify "the"
woman and "the" man to whom he referred, he obviously was talking about the average
woman and the average man, thus overlooking the extent to which individual men and
women do not conform to his model.
29. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
30. Id at 508-09.
31. Id at 508.
32. Three years later, a federal district court held that the exclusion of women from sea
duty violated the equal protection aspect of fifth amendment due process. Owens v. Brown,
[Vol. 31
BENIGN DISCRIMINATION
the Court applied the benign discrimination rationale once again to
uphold a method, since repealed, of computing women's Social Secur-
ity retirement benefits so as to yield a higher pension for them than for
men with the same earnings record.3 4
Since adopting the benign discrimination doctrine in the sex dis-
crimination area, the Court has on several occasions refined the
method for determining whether a claimed benign sex discrimination is
benign in fact. In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,35 it invalidated a Social
Security Act provision which denied a surviving spouse of a covered
female employee with children a benefit that would have been avail-
able to a similarly situated surviving spouse of a covered male em-
ployee. Analyzing the statute as discriminating against the covered
female employee in giving less protection for her survivors than it gave
to survivors of similarly situated male employees, the Court first ex-
amined the statutory scheme and legislative history. It then concluded
that Congress' purpose in enacting the statute was not, as contended by
the government, "to provide an income to women who were, because of
economic discrimination, unable to provide for themselves. ' 36 Rather,
the statutory purpose was to permit widows, but not widowers, with
minor children, "to elect not to work and to devote themselves to the
care of children. '' 37 Finding that it "is no less important for a child to
be cared for by its sole surviving parent when that parent is male rather
than female,"'38 the Court struck down the gender-based distinction in
the statute because it was "entirely irrational ' 39 and extended the bene-
fits of the statute to cover female employees.40
455 F. Supp. 291 (D.D.C. 1978). It is arguable that, rather than being a case decided on
benign discrimination grounds, Ballard merely held that no violation of the equal protec-
tion principle had occurred because of "the demonstrable fact that male and female line
officers in the Navy are not similarly situated with respect to opportunities for professional
service." 419 U.S. at 508. At the same time, much of the language in Ballard is consistent
with the benign discrimination rationale.
33. 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
34. Social Security Act, 64 Stat. 506 § 215 (1950) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 415
(1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
35. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
36. Id at 648.
37. Id
38. Id at 652.
39. Id at 651-52. That the classification was seen by the majority in Wiesenfeld as
"entirely irrational" rendered it violative of equal protection even under the traditional
"any-rational-basis" test.
40. Benefits also were extended to the surviving spouses of deceased covered female
employees. See discussion of "dual aspect" laws at notes 165-73 & accompanying text infa.
As to the propriety of extending the benefits of a statute, rather than invalidating it, to cure a
July 1980]
Most important for present purposes was the Court's observation
that since the purpose of the statute "in no way is premised upon any
special disadvantages of women, it cannot serve to justify a gender-
based distinction which diminishes the protection afforded to women
who do work."'4 1 Similarly, in Califano v. Goldfarb,42 the Court re-
jected a claim that another provision of the Social Security Act 43 was
designed to implement a benignly discriminatory purpose in favor of
women, finding that the claim was merely an afterthought and had not
entered into congressional consideration when the statute was en-
acted.44
Aside from rejecting, in Goldfarb and Wiesenfeld, post-hoc charac-
terizations of sex-discriminatory classifications as benignly-inspired
and insisting upon proof of an original benign purpose on the part of
the law-making authority,45 the Court has more recently, in Orr v.
Orr,46 appeared to have severely narrowed the operational scope of the
benign discrimination doctrine. At issue in Orr was the validity of Ala-
bama statutes permitting wives but not husbands to receive alimony.47
Holding that the sex-based statutory scheme violated the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause, the Court, in an opinion by Jus-
tice Brennan, remanded the case so that the Alabama courts might de-
termine whether the unconstitutional inequality was to be cured by
allowing alimony to be awarded to husbands as well as wives, or by
denying alimony to both groups.48
constitutional defect caused by the under-inclusiveness of its coverage, see text accompany-
ing note 179 infra.
41. 420 U.S. at 648 (emphasis added). This observation demonstrates the majority's
willingness to permit one large group of women to be deliberately discriminated against by
the government if its purpose is to "benignly" discriminate in favor of another large group of
women. See text accompanying notes 161-65 infra.
42. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 402(f)(l)(D) (1976) (repealed by Pub. L. 95-216, § 334(d)(1), 91 Stat.
1527 (1977)). The Social Security Act gave survivors' benefits based on earnings of a de-
ceased husband to his widow regardless of dependency, but § 402(f)(1)(D) required depen-
dency by the widower upon his deceased wife to entitle him to such benefits.
44. 430 U.S. at 214-16.
45. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636
(1975). Although both involved classifications created by Congress, there is no reason to
believe that the same standards would not apply if such classifications were created by state
legislatures or local governments, or even by state and federal courts exercising their com-
mon law powers.
46. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
47. ALA. CODE tit. 30, §§ 30-2-51 to -53 (1975).
48. On remand, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeal validated the alimony statutes by
extending their benefits to needy husbands as well as wives. Orr v. Orr, 374 So. 2d 895 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 993 (1980).
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The Alabama appellate court had stated in Orr that "the Alabama
statutes were 'designed' for 'the wife of a broken marriage who needs
financial assistance.' -49 Reading this as asserting a legislative purpose
of "compensating women for past discrimination during marriage,
which assertedly has left them unprepared to fend for themselves in the
working world following divorce," 5° Justice Brennan nevertheless did
not undertake even the initial inquiry required in the face of a claim of
benign discrimination, namely, to determine whether the intended ben-
eficiaries of the classification had in fact been the victims of past dis-
crimination.5' In his view, even if past discrimination could have been
demonstrated, there was still no reason for the sex-based rule, because
the state already conducted individualized alimony hearings.5 2 Since
those hearings "can determine which women are in fact discriminated
against vis-a-vis their husbands, as well as which family units defied the
stereotype and left the husband dependent on the wife, Alabama's al-
leged compensatory purpose may be effectuated without placing bur-
dens solely on husbands. ' 53 The inquiry not pursued in Orr because of
the occurrence of individualized hearings was, in Justice Brennan's
words, "whether women had in fact been significantly discriminated
against in the sphere to which the statute applied a sex-based classifica-
tion, leaving the sexes 'not similarly situated with respect to opportuni-
ties' in that sphere."'54
These two limitations of the area in which data as to prior discrim-
ination must be sought as an initial step in justifying a benignly dis-
criminatory classification-coupled with Justice Brennan's earlier
references to discrimination "during marriage" 55 and to whether wo-
men were discriminated against "vis-a-vis their husbands" 56-suggest a
conscious determination on the part of the Court majority to narrow
substantially the scope of the benign discrimination doctrine.
57
49. 440 U.S. at 280 (quoting Orr v. Orr, 351 So. 2d 904, 905 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977)).
50. 440 U.S. at 280 (emphasis added).
51. Such inquiries had been expressly or impliedly made in all previous sex-based be-
nign discrimination cases. See generaly id at 290-91, 296-97 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
52. Id at 281.
53. Id at 281-82 (emphasis added).
54. Id at 281 (emphasis by the Court omitted; emphasis added).
55. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
56. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
57. Justice Blackmun's insistence in his Orr concurrence that the Court's language con-
cerning discrimination "'in the sphere' of the relevant preference statute. . . does not imply
that society-wide discrimination is always irrelevant," and "that the language in no way cuts
back" on Kahn appears in context to be a valiant, but futile, attempt to deny the obvious.
440 U.S. at 284.
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The Existence, and Significance for Benign Discrimination, of
Past Discrimination Against Males
The impulse to narrow its scope undoubtedly reflects the dissatis-
faction with the benign sex discrimination doctrine that has been ex-
pressed by members of the Court from the day it was first announced.
Justices White58 and Stevens59 have come close to identifying what, in
this author's opinion, is the doctrine's central defect. And in Orr, Jus-
tice Brennan also identified some dangers in the doctrine,60 expanding
upon earlier observations of Justice Stevens. But no Justice, it is sub-
mitted, has ever seen the problem of benign sex discrimination in its
full dimensions. The Justices' most serious error has been their failure
to appreciate the extent of the societal and legal discrimination that
males have suffered because of their sex and the significance of that
discrimination for the benign discrimination doctrine.
Two dissenting opinions were filed in Kahn. One, by Justice Bren-
nan, in which Justice Marshall joined, objected to Florida's $500 an-
nual exemption for widows not because widowers did not receive the
same benefit, but because too many widows did. In Justice Brennan's
view, the classification was constitutionally defective because of its
overinclusiveness-it benefited rich widows as well as needy ones. 6'
Had the statute been drawn more narrowly so as to exclude non-needy
widows from its coverage, it would have met with his approval, for "in
providing special benefits for a needy segment of society long the vic-
tim of purposeful discrimination and neglect, the statute serves the
compelling state interest of achieving equality for such groups." 62
As for Mr. Kahn, the Florida widower who had sued to have the
benefit of the statute extended to him, and his claim that the statute's
major constitutional defect was its underinclusiveness in failing to
grant widowers the same property tax benefits it granted to widows,
Justice Brennan's reply is especially significant. First he noted that
"the statute neither stigmatizes nor denigrates widowers," 63 a question-
able proposition, especially when one considers the implications of the
statute for the public perception of widowers who had been homemak-
ers or otherwise dependent on their wives for financial support. He
58. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 360-62 (1974) (White, J., dissenting).
59. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 202-14 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). See text
accompanying notes 75-78 infra.
60. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 278-82 (1977).
61. 416 U.S. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62. Id at 358-59.
63. d at 359.
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then added that, were widowers included, it "would not further the
State's overriding interest in remedying the economic effects of past
discrimination for needy victims of that discrimination. While doubt-
less some widowers are in financial need, no one suggests that such need
results from sex discrimination as in the case of widows. '" 64
It is ironic, considering their usual alignment on issues of social
concern, that a view similar to Justice Brennan's was reiterated by Jus-
tice Rehnquist, dissenting two years later in Craig v. Boren.65 Justice
Brennan's majority opinion in Craig66 held that discrimination against
males, as well as discrimination against females, because of sex was
subject to heightened scrutiny under the fourteenth amendment. 67
While appearing to concede in Craig that women had been the histori-
cal victims of social and legal discrimination, Justice Rehnquist insisted
in dissent:
Most obviously unavailable to support any kind of special scrutiny in
this case, is a history or pattern of past discrimination, such as was
relied on by the plurality in Frontiero to support its invocation of
strict scrutiny. There is no suggestion in the Court's opinion that
males in this age group are in any way peculiarly disadvantaged,
subject to systematic discriminatory treatment, or otherwise in need
of special solicitude from the courts.68
Three members of the Court, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Rehnquist, thus have asserted categorically that males have not been
historical victims of sex discrimination. Justice Stevens also has as-
serted that men as a general class historically have not been victims of
sex discrimination. 69 Although no similar assertion has been made by
any other Justice, that the others harbor such views or at least assume
the proposition to be true, is not unlikely. This conclusion is war-
ranted, among other reasons, by Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Powell,
Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger having joined Justice Douglas'
majority opinion in Kahn. A contrary implication is raised, however,
by the position assumed by several Justices, including Justice Brennan
himself, in the majority decision of Craig v. Boren,70 discussed below.7 1
As for Justice White, although his was the second dissenting opin-
64. Id at 359-60 (emphasis added).
65. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
66. Justice Blackmun concurred in Justice Brennan's opinion in Craig except as to part
II-D thereof, which is not relevant here.
67. 429 U.S. at 197.
68. Id at 219 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
69. See text accompanying notes 75-78 infra.
70. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
71. See notes 79-80 & accompanying text infra.
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ion in Kahn, and although he would have invalidated the statute be-
cause of its underinclusiveness in failing to cover needy widowers 7 2 he
nevertheless did not dispute the expressed or implied views of the other
Justices that men as such had not been victims of past societal and legal
discrimination .73
Justice White came tantalizingly close to seeing the defect of be-
nign discrimination when he stated in Kahn that "even if past discrimi-
nation is considered to be the criterion for current tax exemption, the
State nevertheless ignores all those widowers who have felt the effects
of economic discrimination, whether as a member of a racial group or as
one of the many who cannot escape the cycle ofpoverty.' ' 7 4 Nowhere,
however, did he suggest that some, perhaps many, Florida widowers
may have felt the effects of an economic discrimination that was di-
rectly and overwhelmingly related to discrimination they had previ-
ously suffered solely because of their sex.
Only Justice Stevens, of all the members of the Court, has stated
positively that males have been the victims of some past sex discrimina-
tion, but even he has thus far not indicated an adequate appreciation of
the full extent of anti-male sex discrimination or its implications for the
benign discrimination doctrine. Justice Stevens' recognition that sex
discrimination has been a reality for males appears in his concurring
opinion in Craig v. Boren.75 Agreeing with the majority, although for
somewhat different reasons, that the equal protection guarantee of the
fourteenth amendment was violated by the Oklahoma statute that per-
mitted females between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, but not
males in that age bracket, to purchase 3.2 percent beer, Justice Stevens
condemned the classification, because, inter alia, "it is based on an acci-
dent of birth [and] because it is a mere remnant of the now almost univer-
sally rejected tradition of discriminating against males in this age bracket
... "76 In a footnote to this reference to anti-male discrimination,
however, Justice Stevens emphasized that he was referring only to the
long-standing disparity between the age of majority for males and fe-
males.77 And in still another footnote, he stated categorically: "Men as
a general class have not been the victims of the kind of historic, perva-
sive discrimination that has disadvantaged other groups. ' 78 Justice
72. 416 U.S. at 361 (White, J., dissenting).
73. Id at 361-62.
74. Id (emphasis added).
75. 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
76. Id (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 212 n.3.
78. Id at 212 n.1.
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Stevens' recognition of a specfc historical legal discrimination against
males, although limited, is still the only instance of a Supreme Court
Justice acknowledging that anti-male discrimination exists. Certainly,
this acknowledgment is much more forthright than the mere implica-
tion in the Craig majority opinion, ambiguous at best because of the
contrary implication in the Kahn majority opinion, that males have
been the historical victims of sex discrimination. The implication in
Craig arises from the majority's subjecting what they characterize as an
anti-male discrimination to a heightened level of scrutiny for equal
protection purposes,7 9 over Justice Rehnquist's strong objections that
such heightened scrutiny had previously been reserved for groups that
have been the historical victims of discrimination. 80
Thus, only one member of the Court, Justice Stevens, has ex-
pressly acknowledged the existence of a past legal discrimination
against males, but only in the very limited area of the long-standing
sex-based disparity in age of majority.8' Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Rehmquist have categorically denied the existence of social or legal
anti-male discrimination,8 2 and even Justice Stevens has rejected the
idea that men as a class have been victims of "historic, pervasive dis-
crimination. ' 83 As seen from the conflicting implications of Kahn, on
the one hand, and Craig and Frontiero, on the other, many of the other
members of the Court, and at times even Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall, have emitted conflicting signals as to their views on this question.
What, then, has been the extent of legal and societal sex discrimi-
nation suffered by males? What are the implications of such discrimi-
nation for the benign discrimination doctrine? And how does sex
discrimination differ from racial discrimination? Examining these
questions in reverse order, we observe first that although sex and race
discrimination share many social and legal characteristics, they also
differ in ways that are crucial for the benign discrimination question.
The similarities between sex and race discrimination are probably
best described in Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Frontiero v.
79. Id at 197. This same implication that sex classofcations, not merely discrimination
against females, should be regarded as "suspect," thus triggering the overwhelming state
interest test, appears in Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973).
80. 429 U.S. at 218-19 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
81. Whether a lower age of majority for females discriminates against males rather than
against females is problematical; because of the classification's dual aspect it does both. See
notes 138-73 & accompanying text infra.
82. See notes 61-69 & accompanying text supra.
83. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 212 n.l. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
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Richardson,8 4 which postulated a suspect classification analysis for sex-
based classifications. Suspect status, and the heightened level of scru-
tiny it triggers, had previously been assigned by the Court to classifica-
tions based upon race, alienage, and national origin. 85 Comparing
these various types of discrimination, Justice Brennan sought to iden-
tify the characteristics that were common to them and sex discrimina-
tion.
Sex-based classifications are like other recognized suspect classifi-
cations, Justice Brennan suggested, because in each, the classification is
based upon a person's "immutable characteristics. ' 86 In other words,
one can no more change the fact that one is a male or a female than one
can change one's membership in the black race or the white race, or
one's nativity in Mexico, China, or France. A second characteristic
shared by classifications based on sex and those based on race, national
origin, and alienage, suggested Justice Brennan, is that the discrimina-
tion that has historically operated in these realms has been of an "in-
vidious" character.87 "Invidiousness" in this context has been
variously defined by different members of the Supreme Court.88 In
Frontiero, Justice Brennan saw the invidiousness that linked sex-based
classifications with suspect classifications, and differentiated them from
such non-suspect statuses "as intelligence or physical disability," as re-
siding in the fact that a person's sex bears "no relation to ability to
perform or contribute to society. . . [thus] relegating the entire class of
females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities
of its individual members." '89
84. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
85. See notes 17-19 supra.
86. 411 U.S. at 686. Alienage, however, does not appear to be an immutable character-
istic since aliens can, by naturalization, become American citizens. The change, however.
cannot be effected instantaneously and, in some instances, cannot be effected at all.
87. Id at 686-87.
88. In Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), the Court equated
"invidious" gender bias with "intentional" or purposive gender bias. Id at 276-81. In
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979), a Georgia statute that precluded a father who has
not legitimated a child from suing for the child's wrongful death was held to be noninvidi-
ous because it did "not reflect any overbroad generalizations about men as a class, but rather
the reality that in Georgia only a father can by unilateral action legitimate an illegitimate
child." fd at 356. See also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (Stevens, J., concurring): "I
. . . agree . . . that a classification which treats certain aged widows more favorably than
their male counterparts is not 'invidious.' Such a classification does not imply that males are
inferior to females . . . does not condemn a large class on the basis of the misconduct of an
unrepresentative few . . . and does not add to the burdens of an already disadvantaged
discrete minority." Id at 218. Justice Stewart, concurring in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976), equates "invidiousness" with "total irrationality." Id at 215.
89. 411 U.S. at 686-87. It should be noted that certain statutes, such as those based on
[Vol. 31
To these shared characteristics can be added another similarity be-
tween race and sex discrimination, one that sets them apart from all
other kinds of discrimination: members of both groups "carry an obvi-
ous badge." 90 An alien, an illegitimate child, or a person whose na-
tional origin is in a country other than the United States cannot by
sight be distinguished from a citizen, a legitimate child, or an Ameri-
can-born person. Not so with a person who is black or one that is
white; not so with a person who is female or one that is male. If the
extremely rare instances of transvestism or sex-change operations are
put aside, a person's race or sex is always immediately apparent.
Among other consequences flowing from this special visibility in the
case of race or gender is the increased. difficulty of escaping from the
destructive effects of societal biases about these statuses.
What then are the essential dfferences between discriminations
based upon race and those based upon sex? With respect to race dis-
crimination, no one can contend that white people have in the past
been systematic victims of either social or legal discrimination because
they were white. Many white people have no doubt been the victims
of past societal discrimination because of their ethnicity or their reli-
gion, but they have not been discriminated against because of their
race. Furthermore, to whatever extent white people have suffered from
ethnic or religious discrimination, it has always been the result of socie-
tal behavior, that is, a de facto discrimination. It has never been a de
jure discrimination; it has never been the result of state and federal
laws or official practices of state and federal governments.
age, have never been regarded as suspect although they share some of the same characteris-
tics. There are undoubtedly many 17 year old young men and women who have the matur-
ity, wisdom, and self-discipline to enter into binding contracts. There are also undoubtedly
many people over 18 who are not competent to enter into such contracts. Yet in those states
that set 18 as the uniform age of majority, the latter will be allowed to enter into such
contracts, while the former will not. The effect is even more pronounced in states that have
retained a 21 year age of majority rule. Thus, an entire class of 17 year olds will be relegated
to "inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members."
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-87 (1973). Similar classifications are made at the
other end of the age spectrum. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307
(1976). In the case of discrimination against the young, it can be argued that the status is not
immutable (although it is far from clear that both immutability and invidiousness are re-
quired to render a status suspect), because the young person may live long enough to attain
the age of majority. But not all young persons will live that long. Even for those who do, it
is questionable whether the mutability requirement (in order to be deprived of suspect status)
is satisfied by events or occurrences over which a person has no control, such as the passage
of time. As for those discriminated against because of old age, there is no mutability other
than by death; neither by an act of their own will nor by the passage of time will they
become younger.
90. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976).
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By contrast, a casual glance at the treatment males have received
at the hands of the law solely because they are males suggests that they
have paid an awesome price for other advantages they have presuma-
bly enjoyed over females in our society. Whether one talks of the
male's unique obligation of compulsory military service,9' his primary
duty for spousal92 and child support, 93 his lack of the same kinds of
protective labor legislation that have traditionally been enjoyed by wo-
men,94 or the statutory95 or judicial 96 preference in child custody dis-
putes that has long been accorded to mothers vis-a-vis fathers of minor
children, sex discrimination against males in statutes and judicial deci-
sions has been widespread and severe.
Moreover, to the extent that societal discrimination, as opposed to
governmental discrimination, is a factor to be considered in determin-
ing whether a benign discrimination may appropriately be adminis-
tered,97 it is clear that males have been subjected to massive social and
economic discrimination. The general social expectation that men will
perform the breadwinner's role, the equanimity with which men's ex-
clusive liability for military service is regarded by the general popula-
tion, even during times of violent combat; the philosophy that a man's
life is less precious than that of a woman, as expressed in the tradition
of "women and children first" when ships are about to go beneath the
sea, and the raised eyebrows at the prospect of a male who, breaking
the shackles of his traditional sex role, determines to expend most of his
daily energies in caring for his children and doing what have tradition-
ally been regarded as wifely chores within the home, all suggest that
men at all ages have been victims of virulent sex discrimination compa-
rable to the kinds of discrimination that women as a group have suf-
fered.
91. Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451-473 (1976).
92. See KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW, supra note 10, at 69-75.
93. Id
94. Id at 111-31, 178-92. See text accompanying notes 200-12 infra.
95. See KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW, supra note 10, at 3.
96. Id.
97. In Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), the Court nowhere limits its inquiry to
previous legal discrimination against women before approving the benign discrimination at
issue here. On the contrary, it is primarily the employment discrimination faced by women,
essentially in the private sector of the economy, that in the Court's view appears to justify
the preferential treatment granted by Florida in the form of a widows-only property tax
exemption. See text accompanying note 28 supra. Although considerable doubt has been
cast by Orr on the relevance of past societal discrimination against women as a justification
for a benign discrimination in their favor, see text accompanying notes 54, 57 supra, societal
discrimination against one sex is still relevant to determining the propriety of a benign dis-
crimination in favor of the other sex.
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Herein lies the essential difference between the social and legal
phenomena of sex discrimination and racial discrimination. Notwith-
standing the similarities between them, in no other kind of discrimina-
tion other than that based upon sex, whether it be racial, age, religious,
or any other discrimination, can the group that is alleged to be the ben-
eficiary of such discrimination be so accurately described also as its
direct victim.
The willingness of society and the legal system to subject males to
the risk of early death, as seen in their exclusive draft and combat lia-
bility under federal law and in the social expectation that they will be
the last to leave the ship, as well as the unwillingness to subject females
to such risks, are also reflected in the male's role as the family's primary
breadwinner. Although this role, thrust upon males by both society
and the legal system, is changing somewhat, it is far from ended. Jus-
tice Stevens has indicated, imperfectly and indirectly, that he under-
stands the relationship between the male's enforced role as family
breadwinner and his shorter life expectancy than that of the female.
98
In Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart,99 Justice
Stevens wrote the opinion of the Court striking down as a violation of
Title VII's prohibition against sex-based employment discrimination
an employer's practice of requiring its female employees to make larger
monthly contributions to its pension fund than its male employees.
The employer sought to justify this practice by pointing to the female's
higher average life expectancy. Exploring various reasons for this sex-
based difference in life expectancy, Justice Stevens, after noting that
sex-based differences in smoking habits might be a contributing factor,
added: "Other social causes, such as drinking or eating habits-perhaps
even the lingering effects ofpast employment discrimination-may also
affect the mortality differential." 10
Because Justice Stevens was exploring why women live longer
than men, his reference to "employment discrimination" as a mortality
factor clearly refers to discrimination against men. Conceivably, he
might have been referring to racial, religious, or national origin dis-
crimination in the work place. Although both men and women would
be prey to these discriminations, men presumably would have suffered
greater overall effects of such discrimination because, in the past, they
have substantially outnumbered women in the work force. There is,
however, another possible meaning to Justice Stevens' linkage of the
98. See notes 99-100 & accompanying text infra.
99. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
100. Id at 710 n.17 (emphasis added).
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male's shorter life expectancy and employment discrimination. He
could have meant-and he should have meant-that there is also a di-
rect sex-based discrimination against males in the work place that plays
a significant role in their lower life expectancy.
How many males, for example, died earlier than they otherwise
would have only because they did not enjoy the same statutory protec-
tions as women?' 01 How many men, unable to benefit from state laws
that limited women's working hours and lifting requirements, and pre-
scribed minimum wages for women only, had their health impaired by
being forced by their employers to work excessively long hours, lift ex-
cessively heavy weights, under excessively onerous conditions, at
whatever wage their employer was willing to pay?
Indeed, how many such men lived in Florida when Kahn was de-
cided? Given the male's overall shorter life expectancy, the likelihood
that a surviving spouse in Florida, or any other state, would be a wid-
ower rather than a widow was rather slim to begin with. If a male had
lost his life in World War II or Korea or Vietnam, the relationship
between his death and a sex-discriminatory law that, because it nar-
rowed the draftee pool by excluding females, increased his chances of
being selected by his "neighbors and friends" for hazardous military
service would not be difficult to understand. Even in the case of hus-
bands who died before their wives as a result of "natural causes," in
how many instances were their earlier deaths hastened by their efforts
not to disappoint societal and legal expectations about appropriate
male behavior, brought about by social and legal institutions that
locked both sexes into fixed, predetermined roles?
How many men, for example, were crushed both emotionally and
physically by their striving to meet their exclusive legal obligation to
provide for their wives' and children's financial needs? How many
could not break the bonds of chronic unemployment because certain
jobs-secretary, clerk-typist, airline stewardess, elementary school
teacher, nurse, telephone operator-were regarded as unsuited for the
male? How many qualified men were denied such jobs by governmen-
tal employers so that anti-male discrimination, based on "archaic and
overbroad generalizations"' 1 2 about the appropriate roles of men and
women, transcended private, societal behavior and became de jure,
state action? And how many men, although not having lost their lives
in World War II, Korea, or Vietnam, returned from those wars psycho-
101. See notes 226-30 & accompanying text infra.
102. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 207 (1977).
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logically, physically, and economically maimed because of a legal sys-
tem that subjects males, and only males, to the duty of compulsory
military service? In light of these and similar considerations, the Bren-
nan-Marshall view that a more narrowly drawn Kahn-type benign dis-
crimination statute favoring needy widows would be permissible,
although it did not include needy widowers because their need did not
result from sex discrimination,10 3 appears to have been adopted with-
out adequate thought.
The Court's failure to understand the implications of past legal
and social anti-male discrimination for the benign discrimination doc-
trine unfortunately has not been confined to the Kahn case. That fail-
ure pervades every Supreme Court decision approving the benign
discrimination doctrine in the area of gender bias. Thus, in Schlesinger
v. Ballard, 104 the Court upheld a law permitting women naval officers
to remain in the Navy longer than men without being promoted, find-
ing a benign purpose to compensate women for their reduced opportu-
nity to demonstrate their competence as a result of being excluded from
sea duty. As noted above, no one in the case challenged this exclu-
sion. 0 5 Had women officers' exclusion from sea duty been challenged,
it would have focused attention on the fact that men officers not only
had an opportunity, but also were required, to participate in sea duty,
and that sea duty is not an unmixed blessing. While sea duty conferred
some advantages on males, such as permitting them to demonstrate
their competence in a shorter time than women, it also subjected men
to numerous disadvantages,10 6 including the hardship of prolonged ab-
sences from shore-side friends and relatives and increased exposure to
death and injury. 10 7
103. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 360 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
105. See notes 29-32 & accompanying text supra.
106. In other words, it was a dual aspect law. See text accompanying notes 138-74 infra.
107. These were anti-male discriminations within the sphere of the purported benign dis-
crimination favoring women. Male naval officers also were prey to all the other anti-male
social discrimination discussed in reference to Kahn. It should be noted that the require-
ment in Orr of a showing that the beneficiary of the benign discrimination has been the
object of past discrimination within that sphere goes only to the justification for the benign
discrimination. That requirement should not prevent males from showing a generalized past
discrimination against them as a reason for rejecting a benign discrimination for females.
Nor should it prevent females from showing a generalized discrimination against them as a
reason for resisting a benign discrimination favoring males. See text accompanying notes
116-20 infra for a discussion of the pro-male benign discrimination implications of the veter-
ans preference laws in Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 281 (1979) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
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Similarly, in Califano v. Webster,'0 8 the Court, by permitting wo-
men who retire at the same age and with the same earnings record as
men to receive a higher Social Security pension, simply ignored the
social and legal discrimination that men have suffered both within and
without the employment sphere. 0 9 To the extent that a majority in
Wiesenfeld" ° and a plurality in Goldfarb"I would have been willing to
approve the discrimination in those cases, had they been able to find a
congressional purpose to prefer needy widows of covered male employ-
ees over needy widowers, they revealed the same inability to under-
stand the existence and significance of past discrimination against
males.
The recent case of PersonnelAdministrator of Massachusetts v. Fee-
ney' 12 further illuminates the major defect in benignly discriminatory
statutes and official rules that purport to favor one sex while overlook-
ing past social and legal discrimination against the other sex. In Fee-
ney, the question before the Court was the validity vel non, under the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause, of Massachusetts stat-
utes that, using sex-neutral terms, gave military veterans an absolute
preference over non-veterans for the most desirable civil service jobs.
Although the negative impact of the preference was much more se-
verely felt by women (over 98% of Massachusetts veterans were male
and only 1.8% were female),'1 3 a majority of the Court, applying the
discriminatory purpose test of Washington v. Davis14 for alleged un-
constitutional discrimination, held that no unconstitutional discrimina-
tion had occurred as a result of these veterans preference statutes." 15
Justice Marshall, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Bren-
108. 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
109. See note 107 supra.
110. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
111. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
112. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
113. Id at 270.
114. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). In Washington the Court distinguished the requirements for
proving an unconstitutional discrimination and a discrimination that violates Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Under Title VII, although an employer's rule is stated in sex-
neutral or race-neutral terms, a prima facie case of discrimination will be made out if it is
shown that the rule has a markedly disproportionate effect on one sex or one race. See
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). By contrast, under Washington, the fact
that a neutrally phrased rule or statute has a disparate impact upon one race (or, as in
Feeney, upon one sex) will not even establish a prima facie case of unconstitutional discrimi-
nation. To prove that a governmental entity has discriminated against a class in violation of
the federal constitution, it is necessary to prove a governmental purpose to discriminate by
means of the disputed rule or statute.
115. 442 U.S. at 280-81.
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nan, disagreed." 6 As he saw it, a purpose to discriminate against wo-
men in enacting and applying these statutes was readily discernible."1
7
Having decided this, Justice Marshall, unlike the majority, reached the
question of whether the discrimination was justifiable. Although he
did not discuss the issue in precisely these terms, Justice Marshall was
prepared to justify what he perceived as an anti-female, pro-male dis-
crimination only if it was designed to compensate males, presumably
for the past discrimination they had suffered as a result of being exclu-
sively liable for compulsory military service, and then only if an appro-
priate standard of justification had been met by the statutes."1 Justice
Marshall's failure to discuss explicitly the past anti-male discrimination
inherent in an all-male draft resulted from his conclusion that his test,
which appears to be a blend of the intermediate and overwhelming in-
terest tests,' 9 was not met by the statutes. To the extent that the stat-
utes' goals were "important," he asserted, they could be achieved by
alternative methods less drastic than an absolute job preference for vet-
erans, which he perceived as essentially an absolute job preference for
males. Had Massachusetts adopted less drastic alternatives, such as an
absolute preference for a limited duration or merely a point preference
rather than an absolute preference, Justice Marshall made it clear that
he would approve the scheme despite his earlier conclusion that it in
fact discriminated against women. 20
Two important points emerge from the Marshall-Brennan dissent
in Feeney. The first is that benign discrimination in the gender area is a
two-way street. Had the state chosen less drastic ways to be discrimina-
tory, Justices Marshall and Brennan would have upheld the discrimi-
nation although, as they saw it, it favored males and disfavored
females. Secondly, in Feeney, Justices Marshall and Brennan were pre-
pared to approve pro-male compensatory discrimination without con-
sidering the full implications of past discrimination against women,' 2'
116. Id at 281.
117. Id at 285.
118. Id at 286-88.
119. In exploring whether the goals of the statute were "important," Justice Marshall
appears to have applied an intermediate test. Id at 286. But in insisting that the implemen-
tation of those goals be by a least drastic alternative classification Justice Marshall appears
to apply the overwhelming interest test. Id at 287-88.
120. Id at 286-88.
121. Although the Marshall-Brennan dissent in Feeney recognized that the past discrim-
ination against women is a reason for not allowing the absolute veterans' preference in that
case, id. at 281, their willingness to accept a lesser pro-male compensatory discrimination
suggests that they have not accorded as much weight to the fact of prior anti-female discrim-
ination as it deserves.
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just as in Kahn they had previously approved pro-female benign dis-
crimination without considering the implications of past anti-male dis-
crimination. 122
It is clear from the Feeney dissent that the exclusive draftability of
men-and not just the hardships of military services-justifies in Jus-
tices Marshall's and Brennan's opinion what they regard as a discrimi-
nation favoring men over women, rather than one favoring veterans
over non-veterans of either sex. Women have never been subject to the
draft. While they have been spared the hazards and burdens of mili-
tary service, they have also been deprived of any benefits that might
flow from being drafted, such as job training, employment opportuni-
ties, veterans benefits, and the like. For the draft, like other laws that
apply only to one sex, is a dual aspect law. In indicating a willingness
to uphold some forms of veterans' preference as a benign discrimina-
tion designed to compensate male veterans for the sex discrimination
inherent in their military experience, Justices Marshall and Brennan
thus overlook the implications of anti-female discrimination in the very
sphere of the alleged benign discrimination, not to speak of the genera-
lized past discrimination against women in American law and society.
Feeney is the rare case in which benign discrimination is discussed,
or at least hinted at, by members of the Court as compensation for past
anti-male discrimination. In all the other Supreme Court cases in
which the doctrine has been applied, it has been in the context of com-
pensating women for past discrimination. As discussed earlier, 23 in
none of these cases had the Court ever indicated an understanding of
the existence of past social and legal discrimination against men.
If and when the Court finally acknowledges the full extent of past
anti-male discrimination, what should this mean for the benign dis-
crimination doctrine? An answer to that question can be found in a
footnote to Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 124 which foreshadowed the benign discrimination doctrine ulti-
mately approved in Kahn and applied in other cases. In that footnote,
Justice Brennan stated:
It should be noted that these statutes [giving male Army personnel
greater dependents' benefits than female personnel] are not in any
sense designed to rectify the effects of past discrimination. . . . On
the contrary, these statutes seize upon a group-women-who have
historically suffered discrimination in employment, and rely on the
effects of this past discrimination as a justification for heaping on
122. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 357-60 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
123. See notes 58-81 & accompanying text supra.
124. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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additional economic disadvantages. 125
In every Supreme Court case of benign discrimination favoring
women, incuding Kahn, Ballard, and Webster, that discrimination also
has disfavored men.126 In essence, in each of these cases, reliance has
been placed on past discrimination against men "as a justification for
heaping on additional economic disadvantages."'' 27 This practice was
specifically disapproved in Justice Brennan's Frontiero footnote, 28 and
has been disapproved by the Court in other contexts. 129 Recognition of
the past discrimination against men-pervasive, de jure, and societal
discrimination-should therefore lead to the abrogation of benign dis-
crmination that purports to favor women. Conversely, the longstand-
ing discrimination against women in law and society should dampen
any tendency to justify benign discrimination favoring men such as was
reflected in Justice Marshall's dissent in Feeney.
Some will no doubt question whether any account should be taken
of the implications of past anti-male discrimination for pro-female be-
nign discrimination. They will point out that ours has been a male-
dominated culture, that males have always been able to change the
laws on the draft, spousal and child support, protection in the work
place, and the like. In short, they will say that males have not been a
"discrete and insular minority,' 30 powerless to alter the past discrimi-
nation against them. They will argue that the discrimination against
men was thus not "invidious"' 3 ' and that it therefore should not be
taken into account in assessing the propriety of preferential treatment
for females, who were in fact politically powerless with not even the
right to vote until 1920.132
There are several answers to such contentions. First, whether past
discrimination against men has been invidious is irrelevant to this Arti-
cle's central thesis. That thesis is not that the benign discrimination
125. Id at 689 n.22 (citations omitted).
126. Cf. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 282 (1979) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("[t]hat a legislature seeks to advantage one group does not, as a matter of logic
or common sense, exclude the possibility that it also intends to disadvantage another").
127. 411 U.S. at 689 n.22.
128. Id See text accompanying note 125 su.pra.
129. See Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 296-97 (1969). Cf. KANOWITZ,
WOMEN AND THE LAW, supra note 10, at 199 ("[iln one area of legal regulation after an-
other, they will find women continuing to be treated either differently from men or less
favorably, and judges and legislators continuing to emphasize distinctions between the sexes
which, though they are the results of prior unequal treatment, are often presented as justifi-
cations for such unequal treatment in the future").
130. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
131. For a consideration of different meanings of "invidious," see note 88 supra.
132. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
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doctrine should be extended to men because they have been victims of
past discrimination. Rather, what is urged is that past discrimination
against men is a sufficient reason for denying benign, compensatory, or
preferential legal treatment to women-just as past discrimination
against women should be a sufficient reason for denying benign dis-
crimination in favor of men.
Second, despite the apparent political and practical power of men
to have at any time changed the situation, men have been victims of
past invidious discrimination. Appearances here simply do not match
reality. Our nation has always needed an armed force to defend it, for
example, but until recently, it was inconceivable to anyone, male or
female, that the duty of military service should or could devolve upon
women as well as men.' 33 Centuries of sex-role allocation, based on
"habit, rather than analysis,"' 34 simply disabled Americans of either
sex from restructuring the duties of military service, family support,
and protections in the work place so as to permit men and women to
share the burdens and benefits of social existence more equitably.
Viewed in this light, the apparent power of men to change their sex-
based roles in the past can be seen as being more theoretical than real.
In this respect, men were as powerless as any other discrete, insular
minority; past discrimination against them was invidious in every sense
of the word. 135
Recognition of these realities of male powerlessness is, moreover,
implicit in Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Craig v. Boren. 136
Craig, it will be recalled, upheld a heightened level of scrutiny-the
"intermediate" test-for what was characterized by the majority as
anti-male discrimination. The majority did so over the protest of Jus-
tice Rehnquist, who, citing the celebrated Carolene Products foot-
note, 137 argued that such active review had always been reserved for
groups that had been discriminated against and had been members of a
discrete, insular minority. Although Justice Brennan's opinion ignored
133. Registration of men for military service recently was instituted by Congress. H.R.J.
Res. 521, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). A three judge federal district court in Pennsylvania
declared the registration statute unconstitutional as a violation of the guarantee of equal
protection of law because of its failure to include women. With grant of a hearing by the
Supreme Court probable, Justice Brennan stayed the execution of the lower court order that
had declared the statute unconstitutional. New York Times, July 20, 1980, at 1, col. 6.
134. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 222 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
135. The powerlessness of males, despite their apparent control of the levers of political
and economic power, is not unlike the powerlessness of females, who represent approxi-
mately 53% of the United States population.
136. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
137. See note 130 & accompanying text supra.
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these arguments, his approval of heightened scrutiny of anti-male dis-
crimination represents a tacit acknowledgement of the actual past
powerlessness of males to break the bonds of inherited sex-role stereo-
typing. 138
In sum, a major reason for ending sex-based benign discrimination
is the record of past legal and societal discrimination against men. No
Supreme Court Justice has indicated that he understands the dimen-
sions of such past anti-male discrimination, and several appear to be
totally oblivious to it. In addition, no member of the Court has ever
considered the significance of past discrimination against one sex for a
doctrine that permits law-based discrimination that favors the other
sex.
A second major reason for abrogating the benign discrimination
doctrine in the gender area, as the following section demonstrates, is
that laws that purport to grant preferential treatment to one sex also
impose direct burdens or detriments on members of that same sex.
The Perverse Effects Caused by the Dual Aspect of Benign
Discrimination in the Gender Area
In 1964, the statutory age of majority for most purposes in Illinois,
as in many other states, was eighteen for women and twenty-one for
men.1 39 In permitting a female to engage in unfettered buying and sell-
ing and other commercial activities three years earlier than a male, the
Illinois statute clearly granted the former a benefit.140 At the same
time, the lower age of majority frequently represented a burden or det-
riment for females. Thus, in the 1964 case of Jacobson v. Lenhart,'4'
the Illinois Supreme Court upheld against an equal protection attack
the earlier termination-because of the running of a limitations pe-
riod--of a female's right to sue on a tort claim, which reflected the
138. See also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), wherein the Court once again applied a
heightened level of scrutiny to strike down what was perceived as an anti-male discrimina-
tion in statutes that permitted females, but not males, to receive alimony.
139. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 1331 (Smith-Hurd 1961). Such sex-based disparities in the
age of majority may now be illegal in light of Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), and
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
140. In the words of former United States Senator Sam Ervin: "Legally speaking [the
lower age of majority] made a woman an adult 3 years before a man. It gave her the right 3
years earlier to manage her own affairs, to make contracts to dispose of her property, and
even to bring lawsuits, while it left the man under a disability. He couldn't bring a lawsuit
without a legal guardian or aid of a friend. He couldn't make a contract. And he couldn't
dispose of property." Hearings on S.J Res. 61 and SJ Res. 231 Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 182 (1970) (statement of Sam Ervin).
141. 30 Ill. 2d 225, 195 N.E.2d 638 (1964).
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differences in the ages at which females and males attained majority.
To the extent that many young people needed protection against ac-
quiring oppressive obligations, because of their lack of discretion and
knowledge of business matters, the female's lower age of majority also
meant that the state was offering this protection to young men between
the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, but not to young women in the
same age bracket. A nineteen year old male who entered into a disad-
vantageous contract could in most instances disaffirm that contract
before reaching the age of twenty-one, but a nineteen year old female
would be bound by that contract.
The female's lower age of majority thus confers an advantage or
benefit on women while also imposing a detriment, burden, or disad-
vantage upon them. It is, in other words, a dual aspect law, its dual
aspect arising primarily from the fact that similarly situated men and
women are accorded differential treatment.
Another useful way of visualizing the law's dual aspect-one that
will be important when the cure for an unconstitutional sex-based ine-
quality is considered-is to look upon it as two separate laws enacted in
the guise of a single law. One of the two laws confers the advantage on
women mentioned above. In effect, it states: Women, but not men,
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, shall have the right to
engage in business, commercial, property, and other legal transactions
to the fullest extent permitted to any person subject to the laws of this
state. The other unstated, but implied, separate law creates the disad-
vantage. It states: Men, but not women, between the ages of eighteen
and twenty-one, shall be protected against imposition by third parties.
In 1905, the United States Supreme Court, in Lochner v. New
York, 14 2 invalidated a New York statute that limited working hours of
men and women bakery employees to ten a day, holding that the stat-
ute violated the freedom of contract impliedly guaranteed to an em-
ployer and its employees by the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause. But three years later, in Muller v. Oregon,143 the Court held
that due process was not violated by an Oregon statute limiting wo-
men's working hours in certain enterprises to ten hours a day. Al-
though not discussed in precisely these terms, the Oregon law was
perceived by the Court as a species of benign discrimination, designed
to compensate women for the past discrimination they had suffered at
the hands of nature (their generally frailer physiques than men's and
142. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
143. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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their child-bearing functions) 144 and of society (their inability to assert
themselves as well as men in the market place).' 45
There is no doubt that the women-only hours limitations law in
Muller, in one of its aspects, conferred a positive benefit on women. As
a result of such laws, which soon were enacted in other states on a
"half-a-loaf' theory 146 because of the Lochner-Muller sequence of deci-
sions, female, unlike male, workers did not have to fear being forced to
work unwanted overtime hours. Because of these laws, employers ei-
ther would not ask females to do so, or, if they did, female workers
could refuse the request with relative impunity. By contrast, a male
risked being discharged or otherwise disciplined if he refused his em-
ployer's request or demand that he work overtime hours. Working wo-
men covered by such laws thus could spend part of their days with their
families and children; 47 they also had more time than men for leisure,
recreation, rest, the life of the mind, or any other endeavour they
wished to pursue.
Once again, the laws which so clearly benefited women also bur-
dened them in ways they did not burden men. 48 One probable effect
of these laws was to discourage employers, whose operations occasion-
ally or frequently required employees to work overtime, from hiring
women, since they were prohibited from permitting or requiring those
women to work the needed overtime. A major impact of the women-
only hours limitations laws was thus to reduce women's employment
opportunities. Moreover, those women who desired overtime work for
the extra compensation such work might yield were also denied this
opportunity by women-only hours limitations laws.' 49
144. Id at 421.
145. Id at 422.
146. See Hearings on SJ Res. 61 and S.J Res. 231 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 173 (1970) (statement of Leo Kanowitz).
147. Many women who worked outside the home undoubtedly were expected then, as
they often are now, to bear the major family responsibility for myriad tasks within the home
as well.
148. Both men and women are burdened by an hours limitations law that applies to
both sexes by being denied the right to earn extra compensation through overtime work.
But this is a shared burden. It is also offset by other social and legal institutions, such as
minimum wage laws and effective union representation, both of which are designed to in-
sure that workers earn an adequate living without having to rely on overtime work. By
contrast, the woman-only overtime limitations laws, in addition to conferring special bene-
fits on women, also burden them with special disadvantages.
149. While overtime work properly might be regarded as a social evil to be discouraged
by absolute statutory prohibitions or statutory requirements for extraordinary compensa-
tion, see KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW, supra note 10, at 124-25, allowing men to work
overtime inevitably reduced pressures on unions and other institutions to secure wage rates
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Before we examine the resolution of the problems created by the
dual aspect of a purportedly benignly discriminatory law, it is again
important to visualize the hours-limitations law for women only,
though a single law in form, as two separate laws in effect. One is a
genuinely protective, benefit-conferring law for women. It states, in ef-
fect: Women, but not men, have a right to refuse to work more than
ten hours (or eight, or whatever the limit may be) a day. The other,
burden-imposing law, for women, states: Employers must not hire wo-
men, though they may hire men, for any jobs requiring occasional, or
any, work in excess of ten hours a day; and men, but not women, are
permitted to earn, over their regular daily wages, any extra compensa-
tion they may derive from overtime work.
In approving the overtime restrictions for women employees in
Muller, the Supreme Court focused entirely on the law's beneficial as-
pect and ignored its detrimental aspect, which severely damaged wo-
men in the workplace. The Court has dealt similarly with every law
that it has approved as being benignly discriminatory toward women.
In each instance, it has seen only the law's beneficial aspect and has
ignored its detrimental aspect.
In Calfano v. Webster,' 50 for example, the Court approved, as be-
nign discrimination, the more favorable Social Security pension bene-
fits accruing to women than to men who retire at the same age and with
the same earnings records. Entirely ignored by the Court was the fact
that this disparity tended to induce more women than men to retire
early and that knowledge of this tendency could discourage an em-
ployer from hiring women.' 5'
Similarly, the approval by the Court in Schlesinger v. Ballard,152
on benign discrimination grounds, of a strict "up or out" system for
that would, of themselves, have been adequate. Because women worked in the same eco-
nomic environment as men, they bore the brunt of a lower wage than they otherwise would
have received had no overtime work been allowable to either sex, but were deprived of the
right, available to men, to make up for lower wages by means of overtime work and the
extra income it generated.
150. 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
151. The existence of equal employment opportunity legislation, such as Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended, and state counterparts, of course would prevent an em-
ployer from discriminating on grounds of sex. Under Title VII, pension schemes favoring
women over men have been invalidated. See, e.g., Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.,
477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973). Cf Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Sex Discrimi-
nation Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. 1604.9(0 (1979) ("[iut shall be an unlawful employment prac-
tice for an employer to have a pension or retirement plan which establishes different
optional or compulsory retirement ages based on sex, or which differentiates in benefits on
the basis of sex").
152. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
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male Naval officers and a guarantee for female officers of thirteen years
before mandatory discharge for failure to be promoted, entirely over-
looked one detrimental impact on women of such a differential,
namely, that females were rendered ineligible for severance pay for a
longer period than males, an issue raised by a female officer in a post-
Ballard federal court case, Two v. United States.153 Nor did the Court
in Ballard take into account another detrimental impact of the policy
upon women: the easing of pressure on their superiors to promote
them precisely because women officers could stay in the service two
years longer than men without being promoted.
Even in Kahn, where the widows-only tax exemption was per-
ceived as conferring a benefit on women-at least on that portion of the
population of women who were widows-the law also disfavored wo-
men. For example, those women who died before their husbands and
who, during their lifetimes, were concerned with how their surviving
husbands might fare financially in their struggle for existence, received
less favorable treatment as a result of this purportedly benign discrimi-
nation than did men who were concerned about how their widows
might fare. 154
The dual aspect of a benignly discriminatory law, that is, its impo-
sition of a burden as well as the conferral of a benefit on the group it
seeks to assist, often affects the same women in both aspects. This is the
case with laws that prescribe women-only maximum working hours,
minimum wages, more favorable retirement benefits, and other protec-
tive laws in the employment sphere. In those instances, the laws' dual
aspects stem principally, if not entirely, from their exclusive applicabil-
ity to women. 155 At other times, as in the Kahn-type tax preference,
however, the dual aspect of a law is present because the legislature or
153. 471 F.2d 287 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973).
154. See also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636 (1975). In both cases, the Court perceived the special Social Security benefits for
widows, and their denial to widowers, as a discrimination against the covered female em-
ployee in that her contributions to the Social Security system produced less protection for
her family in the event of her death than was acquired by a male covered employee for his
family. Dissenting in Goldfarb, Justice Rehnquist disputed this analysis, saying that one
could on that basis have argued in Kahn that "the real discrimination was between the
deceased spouses of the respective widow and widower, who had doubtless by their contri-
butions to the family or marital community helped make possible the acquisition of the
property which was now being disparately taxed." 430 U.S. at 239 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing). Although Justice Rehnquist scoffs at the possible use of such an argument in the Kahn
situation, his hostility towards it once again reflects an inadequate understanding of the dual
aspect of all laws that purport to discriminate benignly in favor of one sex.
155. See notes 146-49 & accompanying text supra.
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the court, or both, have focused their attention on only one part of the
group, and not another. 56
In Duley v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,' 57 for example, the Illinois
Supreme Court upheld a more favorable survivor's benefit for widows
than for widowers under the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act,' 58
finding, in effect, a benignly discriminatory purpose in the gender dif-
ferential to favor widows because of a "rational difference" between
the sexes "based on the disparate earning power of men and wo-
men." 59 Totally ignored by the court, however, were the adverse ef-
fects upon another group of women-covered women employees-
caused by this sex-based disparity in a law purportedly designed to
help women. In granting widows greater benefits than widowers, the
Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act, like similar laws in other
states,' 60 deprived women workers of the family protection accruing
from their employment that it provided to covered male employees.
This detrimental aspect, for women, of a law granting widows
greater benefits than widowers was recognized by a majority of the
Supreme Court in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld'6' and by a plurality of the
Court in Cal/fano v. Goldfarb. 62 At the same time, other parts of the
opinions in those cases suggest that the Justices understood neither the
dual aspects of a benignly discriminatory law nor the perverse results
that can flow from focusing on only one of those aspects in isolation
from the other.
In both cases, the Government argued unsuccessfully that Con-
gress had had a benign purpose when it enacted the disputed provi-
sions, namely, to compensate widows of covered employees for past
156. Here too it is useful, for purposes of devising appropriate remedies, to regard the
law, because of its dual aspect, as effectively comprising two separate laws. In Kahn, the
Florida legislature can be seen as having enacted one law that stated, in effect, that widows
shall be given tax preference over widowers and another law that stated, in effect, that the
tax law shall prefer husbands over wives in assuring the economic well-being of their surviv-
ing spouses.
157. 44 Ill. 2d 15, 253 N.E.2d 373 (1969).
158. In Duley, the surviving husband of a covered woman employee who had been fa-
tally injured in the course of her employment was limited by the state's Workmen's Com-
pensation Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.7(f) (1963), to receiving a $500 burial expense
and was precluded from bringing a common law tort action against the employer for his
wife's death. Had the survivor been the wife of a covered male employee killed under such
circumstances, she would have been entitled to substantial death benefits under the Act.
159. 44 Ill. 2d at 19, 253 N.E.2d at 375.
160. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3501(a) (West 1971), invalidated in Arp v. Workers'
Comp. Appeals Bd., 19 Cal. 3d 395, 563 P.2d 849, 138 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1977).
161. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
162. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
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discrimination against them and for the generally greater financial
needs of widows as compared to widowers. The Government failed
only because the majority in Wiesenfeld and the plurality in Goldfarb
were not at all persuaded that this had been Congress' purpose. Pre-
sumably, these Justices-in both cases through an opinion by Justice
Brennan-were prepared to validate such benign discrimination had
they been convinced that Congress' purpose in fact had been benign.
Indeed, in both cases Justice Brennan embarked upon an elaborate ex-
ploration to determine whether Congress' apparent preference for wid-
ows had a compensatory purpose or was merely an "archaic and
overbroad generalization"163 about sex roles, or as stated in Justice Ste-
vens' concurring opinion, was "the accidental by-product of a tradi-
tional way of thinking about females,' 64 the result of legislative
"habit, rather than analysis."' 65
Having characterized the fundamental discrimination in both
cases as directed against covered women employees, Justice Brennan
could hardly have maintained that it was also benign toward those
same covered women employees. In seeking to determine whether
Congress might have had a benign purpose to benefit needy widows,
therefore, the Wiesenfeld majority and Goldfarb plurality were pre-
pared to permit a large group of women (covered employees) to be
deliberately, seriously, and discriminatorily injured by the federal gov-
ernment for the sake of assisting another group of women (surviving
spouses of covered male employees). 166
More recently, in Orr v. Orr, 16 7 in which the Court invalidated a
one-way alimony statute on equal protection grounds, Justice Brennan
noted that had the statute in Orr been upheld it would have produced
163. Id at 211.
164. Id at 223 (Stevens, J., concurring).
165. Id at 222.
166. But see Arp v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 19 Cal. 3d 395, 563 P.2d 849, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 293 (1977), which rejected the claim of a benign purpose in a sex-discriminatory fea-
ture of the state's Workers' Compensation Act and noted, among other reasons for invalidat-
ing the statute on federal constitutional grounds, that it was "potentially disadvantage[ous
to] large numbers of the very sex it purports to aid." Id at 407, 563 P.2d at 855, 138 Cal.
Rptr. at 300. In light of such considerations, once the majority in Wiesenfeld and the four-
member plurality in Goldfarb had determined that the discrimination in question was di-
rected against covered women employees, they ought not to have examined the statute to see
whether it was "benign" toward surviving wives of covered male employees. Precedent for
not inquiring as to a sex-based classification's benign purpose, even where the Court as-
sumes such a purpose might be revealed by the inquiry, has been established in Orr v. Orr,
440 U.S. 268 (1979).
167. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
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"perverse results."'' 68 Because only the financially secure wife whose
husband is in need would be advantaged by the discrimination, the
classification would generate "additional benefits only for those it has
no reason to prefer."' 169 It is submitted, however, that the results are
even more perverse where a classification inflicts damage upon those it
intends to benefit. This would have been the result in Wiesenfeld and
Goldfarb had Justice Brennan and his colleagues been persuaded that
Congress' purpose had been to prefer widows over widowers. 70 It has
in fact been the result of every purportedly benign-discriminatory stat-
ute or rule that has been upheld by the Court. Such perverse results
have been caused by the dual aspect of these discriminatory laws and
the Court's failure adequately to recognize their dual nature or its sig-
nificance for the benign discrimination cases it has decided.
Blindness to the dual aspect of benignly discriminatory laws has,
of course, not been total. Limited recognition that a benignly discrimi-
natory law can injure the group it seeks to aid does appear in Justice
Brennan's Orr opinion. He notes there, for example, that "classifica-
tions which distribute benefits and burdens on the basis of gender carry
the inherent risk of reinforcing the stereotypes about the 'proper place'
of women and their need for special protection."' 71 But the reinforce-
ment of stereotypical notions about the sexes, while an important con-
sideration, 172 is in a relative sense the conferral of a vague, indirect,
and remote burden. Far more serious, and thus far entirely ignored by
168. fd at 282.
169. Id at 283. Justice Stevens had made a similar observation in his Goldfarb concur-
rence two years earlier. "The [wives] who benefit from the disparate treatment are those
who were . . . nondependent on their husbands." Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 221
(Stevens, J., concurring).
170. Justice Stevens' position, in his concurrence in Goldfarb, although raising other
problems, does not suffer from this defect. Although he too failed to grasp the "dual aspect"
character of the discrimination at issue in Goldfarb, he nevertheless would have held that the
statute did not discriminate against covered women employees because of the non-contrac-
tual nature of the right to Social Security benefits. 430 U.S. at 217. He saw the issue, there-
fore, as going to whether widowers had been unconstitutionally discriminated against and
concluded that they had been. In holding that the classification favoring widows did not
reflect a benign purpose, Justice Stevens, unlike the four-member plurality who, for the
reasons discussed at note 166 supra, should not even have tried to determine this question,
did not place himself in their contradictory position.
171. 440 U.S. at 283.
172. See KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW, supra note 10, at 4: "Not only do legal
norms tend to mirror the social norms that govern male-female relationships; they also exert
a profound influence upon the development and change of those social norms. Rules of law
that treat of the sexes per se inevitably produce far-reaching effects upon social, psychologi-
cal and economic aspects of male-female relationships beyond the limited confines of legis-
lative chambers and courtrooms."
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31
BENIGN DISCRIMINATION
the Court, are the direct, severe, and immediate burdens imposed on
one sex by the laws that purport to grant that sex special benefits to
compensate for past discrimination.
Finally, it should be noted that just as the legal and social phe-
nomena of racial and sex discrimination were distinguished in an ear-
lier part of this Article, insofar as the impact on the allegedly dominant
group in each realm was concerned, so too is there a fundamental dif-
ference between the dual aspects of benignly discriminatory laws in
both areas. Racial minorities can of course suffer adverse effects from a
discriminatory law or official practice designed to compensate them for
past discrimination. But such adverse effects would be limited to the
reinforcement of stereotypical thinking about the "'proper place' of
[minorities] and their need for special protection."'173 Those adverse
effects would not include the severe, immediate, and direct detriments
that are meted out to the gender sought to be assisted by a particular
benign rule or statute.174
As the first section of this Article demonstrated, the existence and
implications of historical anti-male discrimination militate against the
continuance of the benign discrimination doctrine in the gender
area.' 75 The dual aspect of laws that allegedly discriminate for a be-
nign purpose and the perverse results they produce are an additional
reason for abrogating the doctrine in this area.
A further question that must be considered is whether abrogating
the benign sex discrimination doctrine will not only relieve women of
the burdens imposed by laws that were enacted to compensate them for
past discrimination, but will also deprive them of the beneficial aspects
173. See text accompanying note 171 suprz See also United Jewish Organizations v.
Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 173-74 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring).
174. The adverse effects for women of a women-only minimum wage or overtime pay
law are qualitatively different from the adverse effects upon minorities of general minimum
wage laws that are alleged to arise by some economists of the Chicago School, primarily
Professor Milton Friedman. For example, the adverse effects upon women of a women-only
minimum wage law are caused by the law's dual aspect. Employers need a work force. If
they have a choice, other things being equal, they will hire males rather than females be-
cause of the women-only minimum wage requirement. By contrast, in the case of a sex-
neutral minimum wage, the basic problem of employers is whether to hire people who, be-
cause of inadequate training or lack of skills, may not produce enough to justify payment of
the minimum wage. Presumably, if employers could pay less, they would hire such people-
or so the argument runs-who would be overwhelmingly black or members of other minori-
ties. Employer reluctance to hire women because of a women-only minimum wage is not
based on any notions that the prescribed wage is higher than their work should yield.
Rather, it is based, however, on the assumption that the employer will receive as good or
better work from male employees, but at a lower wage.
175. See notes 91-103 & accompanying text supra.
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of those laws. As seen in the following section, in most instances,
courts, not to speak of legislatures, can grant remedies that will both
remove the burdens and preserve the benefits of benignly discrimina-
tory laws, while respecting the principle of equal treatment without re-
gard to sex.
Remedying Sex Discrimination
In addition to the common characteristics described in the previ-
ous sections, the three modem benign sex discrimination cases decided
by the Supreme Court-Kahn, Ballard, and Webster-share other im-
portant features. In each, the plaintiff was a male. In none, did the
male plaintiff seek to have the Court deprive women of the benefits
accorded them by the respective laws in question: the tax exemption in
Kahn; the thirteen-year discharge-free period in the Navy, despite the
failure to be promoted in the interim in Ballard; and the exclusion of
three low-earnings years in computing Social Security retirement bene-
fits in Webster. Finally, in all of these cases, the male plaintiffs sought
to have the benefits of these laws extended to them.
That the courts have the power to extend legislatively created ben-
efits to a group or class not intended to have been benefited by the
legislature is by now abundantly clear. In the sex discrimination cases
themselves, the Supreme Court has done this on numerous occasions in
recent years. Thus in Frontiero v. Richardson, 76 upon finding an un-
constitutional sex-based inequality in allowances for Army dependents,
the Court extended the right to receive the benefits to women. 177 Simi-
lar extension remedies were approved in Wiesenfeld 78 and in Gold-
farb179-in the latter case notwithstanding the enormous additional
financial burden this imposed on the federal government.
The judicial extension of benefits to a group that a legislature or
court had deliberately excluded, based on a finding of unconstitutional
underinclusiveness of a classification, is, moreover, not a recent innova-
tion. In the 1968 case of Levy v. Louisiana,80 the Court found that the
State's denial of a right to an illegitimate child to sue for its mother's
176. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). See notes 20-23 & accompanying text supra.
177. 411 U.S. at 690-91 & n.25.
178. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). See notes 35-41 & accompanying
text supra.
179. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977). See notes 42-43 & accompanying text
supra.
180. Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, estimated that the decision would cost
the government $750,000,000 per year. 430 U.S. at 219-20.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31
BENIGN DISCRIMINATION
wrongful death while according that right to a legitimate child denied
the former equal protection. The Court cured the inequality by ex-
tending the right to the illegitimate child rather than by taking the right
away from the legitimate child. As early as 1872, the Court, in Railway
Co. v. Whitton,18' found that the Judiciary Article of the Federal Con-
stitution had been violated by a territorial legislature's law that, by lim-
iting wrongful death suits to the territorial courts, denied plaintiffs the
right to sue in the federal courts. In that case too, rather than invalidat-
ing the legislatively grant& right to sue in the territorial courts, the
Court extended it to the federal courts despite the legislature's intention
not to permit suits in such tribunals. 8 2
Perhaps the most succinct statement of the principles that should
govern a court's decision whether to abrogate or extend a statutory
benefit on the ground that the class to which it applies is underinclusive
appears in the opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Schmoll v.
Creecy: 18 3
[T]he question is whether the Legislature would want the statute to
survive, and that inquiry cannot turn simply upon whether the stat-
ute, if adjusted to the constitutional demand, will cover more or less
than its terms purport to cover. Although cases may be found which
seem to speak in such mechanical terms, we think the sounder course
is to consider what is involved and to decide from the sense of the
situation whether the Legislature would want the statute to suc-
cumb.' 84
In most cases in which courts have been faced with the "extension-
abrogation" choice, the guiding principle has thus been to implement a
presumed legislative choice. Stated differently, the question has been,
what would the legislature have preferred had it known that the classi-
fication it created would be held invalid because of its underinclusive-
ness? Would it have preferred to achieve the required equality by
taking the benefit away from the group to which it had granted the
benefit or by extending the benefit to the group from which it had been
withheld?
The Supreme Court has not always directly confronted the exten-
sion-abrogation question in sex discrimination cases. Nevertheless, its
extension remedies in Levy, Whitton, Frontiero, Wiesenfeld, and Gold-
farb have all impliedly been based on presumed legislative intentions.
This implication is especially clear in the latter three cases, in each of
181. 80 U.s. (13 Wal.) 270 (1872).
182. Id at 286.
183. 54 N.J. 194, 254 A.2d 525 (1969).
184. Id at 202, 254 A.2d at 530.
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which the Court extended the respective federal benefits despite the
Government's protests that this would impose substantial burdens on
the federal fisc.
The Court's implied assessment of presumed congressional inten-
tion on abrogation versus extension of the federal benefits in Frontiero,
Wiesenfeld, and Goldfarb is also borne out by its differing behavior in
Orr v. Orr'85 and Stanton v. Stanton.18 6 In the latter cases, state law
had conferred certain benefits that the Court held to be unconstitu-
tional because the benefited class was underinclusive. In Stanton, it
was the benefit 87 of an earlier age of majority for females than for
males. In Orr, it was the benefit of alimony rights for wives but not for
husbands. In both cases, the Court did not decide the question of ex-
tension or abrogation. Rather, it remanded each case to the state courts
so that those courts could make the decision.
The Court's different treatment of federal and state laws, with re-
spect to determining the proper tribunal to decide the extension-abro-
gation issue, is merely a specific application of the familiar principle
that the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the meaning of federal
laws while this role, with respect to state laws, is performed by the
states' highest courts. Just as courts often decide what a legislature
meant by language it used in a statute, so in resolving the extension-
abrogation issue, courts decide what the legislature meant, that is, what
it would have intended with respect to extension or invalidation, if its
legislatively created classification were to be held unconstitutional be-
cause of its underinclusiveness.
How an underinclusive classification is to be remedied will thus be
decided by the federal courts if the classification is created by federal
statutes or by federal common law. By contrast, the same issue with
respect to classifications created by state law will be decided by the
state courts. In still a third category, special problems arise with respect
to the extension-abrogation issue where state law has created the classi-
fication but the issue arises in a case within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the federal courts. This problem most often arises when state "protec-
tive" labor laws are challenged in federal court as violating the com-
mand of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act' 88 that employers, inter
alia, not discriminate against employees and prospective employees on
185. 440 U.S. 268 (1979). See notes 46-57 & accompanying text supra.
186. 421 U.S. 7 (1975). See note 15 supra.
187. See text accompanying notes 140-41 supra for a discussion of the benefit-burden
dual aspect of sex-discriminatory laws.
188. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
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the grounds of sex. The exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts over
Title VII actions requires that the federal courts, when they find that
the state law violates Title VII's equality principle, also decide in the
first instance whether the state legislature would have preferred to ex-
tend the benefit of the state law to men or to take it away from wo-
men.189
It is highly probable, therefore, that had the Supreme Court re-
jected the benign sex discrimination doctrine, it would have extended
to the male plaintiff the benefit of the thirteen year protection against
mandatory discharge previously enjoyed by female naval officers in
Ballard rather than take that benefit away from female naval officers.
Similarly, the Court would have extended to the male plaintiff in Web-
seer the more favorable method of computing Social Security retire-
ment benefits, which Congress itself did shortly after Webster arose. 190
In those cases, abrogation of the benign discrimination doctrine would
have represented no loss for women who had previously profited from
the beneficial aspects of those laws. They would have retained those
benefits while men too would have enjoyed them. Because those laws
also imposed a burden or detriment on women primarily as a result of
their nonapplicability to men, the extension to men of these laws' bene-
ficial aspects would also have removed their burdensome or detrimen-
tal aspects from women.
A different issue arises with respect to the disputed tax preference
for women in Kahn. There the tax preference was state-created. The
question of its extension or abrogation would, therefore, have had to
have been decided by the Florida Supreme Court. Unlike the task
thrust upon the Utah court in Stanton and the Alabama court in Orr,
which involved assessing legislative intentions about restructuring
rights and obligations between private parties and which appeared to
require immediate resolution, the task in Kahn would have appeared to
involve divining legislative intentions about restructuring governmen-
tal largesse toward private parties. Were Kahn's tax preference to be
189. See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), invalidating as an equal protection
violation Oklahoma's prohibition of sales of 3.2% beer to 18 to 20 year old males but not to
females in that same age bracket. The case arose in the federal court in the first instance,
and there was thus no state court to which it could be remanded. By reversing the federal
district court which had upheld the prohibition of the sale to 18 to 20 year old males, the
Supreme Court in effect granted the right to purchase 3.2% beer to males rather than take it
away from females. Significantly, the Court stated that the "Oklahoma Legislature is free to
redfne any cutoff age for the purchase and sale of 3.2% beer that it may choose, provided
that the redefnition operates in a gender-neutral fashion." Id at 210 n.24 (emphasis added).
190. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 314 (1977).
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extended to widowers it might have cost Florida an undetermined but
substantial sum of money in lost tax revenues. If the Florida Supreme
Court acted like other state courts have acted in comparable circum-
stances, there would be a strong possibility that it would invalidate the
tax preference for widows rather than extend it to widowers. Had the
Florida court chosen this course, its actions would have been contrary
to those of the United States Supreme Court that, as we have seen, has
extended benefits to the group from which they had been unconstitu-
tionally withheld,191 despite a far greater financial cost to the federal
government, absolutely as well as relatively, than the cost Florida
would incur were the widow's tax preference to be extended to widow-
ers. 1
9 2
State courts, 193 and some lower federal courts in Title VII cases, 194
have been much less willing than the Supreme Court to extend benefits
to a class excluded by the legislature whose intentions they have been
authorized to ascertain. These courts have often asserted that to extend
the benefit to a group deliberately excluded by the legislature would
constitute judicial usurpation of the legislative function. What these
courts fail to recognize is that the decision to take the benefit away
from the class the legislature intended to benefit-when that benefit
can be preserved by extending it to the group the legislature had origi-
nally excluded-is analytically no more nor less a judicial usurpation
of the legislative function than the extension itself.
Recognition of this principle is, moreover, implicit in the recent
Supreme Court decision in Calfano v. Wescot/,19 5 in which the Court
not only extended a benefit to an excluded class, but implied that under
some circumstances a court might restructure a statute 96 to have it con-
form to constitutional requirements, though finding those circum-
stances to be absent in Westcot itself.
The facts in Westcolt were relatively simple. Federal law provided
191. Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979). See notes 194-206 & accompanying text
infra. See also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
192. See notes 223-26 & accompanying text infra for a discussion of why extension is
appropriate, notwithstanding the economic burdens it might impose on employers.
193. See, e.g., State v. Fairfield Communities Land Co., 260 Ark. 277, 538 S.W.2d 698,
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1004 (1976); Arp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 19 Cal. 3d 395, 563
P.2d 849, 138 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1977).
194. See, e.g., Homemakers Inc. v. Division of Indus. Welfare, 509 F.2d 20 (9th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1063 (1976).
195. 443 U.S. 76 (1979).
196. Restructuring, as used in this Article, is primarily a shorthand expression for invali-
dation of the detrimental aspects of a sex discriminatory law, coupled with extension to the
previously non-benefited sex of the law's beneficial aspects.
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benefits to families whose dependent children were deprived of support
because of their father's unemployment but denied benefits in the case
of the mother's unemployment. 197 The Court, on the basis of the Craig
test, held that this gender-based classification violated the equal protec-
tion aspect of fifth amendment due process. But because no party had
argued that nullification of the program was the proper remedial
course, the Court majority, in an opinion by Justice Blackmun, stated
that it would be inclined to consider that issue only if the power to
order extension of the program were clearly beyond the constitutional
competence of a federal district court. 198 That no such remedial inca-
pacity existed was strongly suggested, noted Justice Blackmun, by the
Court's previous decisions, which routinely had affirmed district court
judgments ordering extension of federal welfare benefits. 199
Although no party in Westcott had opposed the extension princi-
ple, one, the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Public
Welfare, who administers the Act in that state, had sought to have the
extension by the district court take a particular form. In his view, it
was proper to permit either a mother's or a father's unemployment to
qualify a needy family for benefits, but only if the parent in question
could show that he or she was both unemployed and the family's "prin-
cipal wage-earner." 200
The statute, of course, said nothing about the unemployed father
having to be the family's principal wage-earner to qualify the family
for benefits when he becomes unemployed. Neither did the statute
state anything about qualifying families if the mother becomes unem-
ployed. Yet, the majority, as we have seen, had no difficulty in effec-
tively rewriting the statute to make it conform to constitutional
requirements by extending benefits to families in which the mother is
unemployed. This result was reached partly because no party had
raised that issue but also because of a discerned congressional intention
that the unconstitutionality should be cured by extending the benefits,
as evidenced by the strong severability clause in the Social Security Act
197. 443 U.S. at 79-80. Although the parties had not argued that nullification of the
program was the proper remedial choice, Justice Powell, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, decried "the extension of benefits [that] Con-
gress wished to prevent." Id at 95 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell would have pre-
ferred an injunction prohibiting further payment under the program, which would
"conserve the funds appropriated until Congress determines which group, if any, it does
want to assist." Id at 96.
198. Id at 90-91.
199. Id at 89-90.
200. Id at 91.
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and the hardship that would be imposed on families Congress plainly
meant to protect, were the program simply nullified.20 '
Nevertheless, the majority in Westcott referred to the particular
form of extension urged by the Commissioner, in contrast to the simple
extension that it approved, as a "restructuring" of the Act.20 2 Signifi-
cantly, the majority rejected the proposed "restructuring" in Westcott,
not because it disapproved of the idea of restructuring in principle, but
only because it found restructuring to be inappropriate under the cir-
cumstances of Westcot itself.20 3 Were the Commissioner's "model" of
providing benefits to only those families in which the unemployed par-
ent of either sex was the principle wage-earner adopted, it would have
meant cutting off benefits to some needy families already receiving
benefits "merely because the unemployed father cannot prove 'bread-
winner' status. ''204
The Court also indicated that this type of restructuring, even more
than when a court extends a benefits program to redress unconstitu-
tional underinclusiveness, "risks infringing legislative prerogatives. 20 5
In contrast to mere extension, which has "the virtue of simplicity," the
"principal wage-earner" solution "would introduce a term novel in the
[Aid for Dependent Children] scheme, and would pose definitional and
policy questions best suited to legislative or administrative elabora-
tion. °206 Therefore, "any fine-tuning of. . . coverage along 'principal
wage-earner' lines is properly left to the democratic branches of the
Government. In sum, we believe the District Court. . . adopted the
simplest and most equitable extension possible. ' 20 7
From the Court's language and its disposition of the restructuring
issue in Westcott, it can be concluded that extension of a benefit to an
excluded class, even if it involves the restructuring of a statute, is more
likely to be approved by the Court the simpler and more equitable that
extension or restructuring appears. As will be demonstrated below,
some forms of extension or restructuring of benefits which at first
glance appear to be far from simple, turn out upon closer examination,
and especially with the aid of the dual aspect analysis proposed in an
earlier part of this Article, to be simple and equitable in fact.
201. Id at 92-93.
202. Id at 92.
203. Id
204. Id.
205. Id
206. Id
207. Id at 93.
[Vol. 31
In a series of cases, federal courts have struck down, as violations
of Title ViI's equality principle, a variety of state protective labor laws
that, as written, applied only to women workers. As indicated earlier,
the prototype of such laws had been upheld as a benign discrimination
by the 1908 Supreme Court decision in Muller v. Oregon.208 Among
the types of laws that have been invalidated in recent years as a result
of Title VII have been those that prohibit an employer from permitting
only women workers from working more than a given number of hours
in a day,209 those requiring daily overtime pay for women workers
only,210 those imposing a maximum hour limitations for women work-
ers only,2 1 those limiting the weights only women workers can be re-
quired to lift in the course of their employment, 21 2 and those requiring
seats at work and periodic rest and meal periods for women workers,
but not for men.213
In only one case, Potlatch Forests, Inc. v. Hays,2 14 did a federal
district court, whose decision was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals,215 uphold such a law even though it had been enacted by
the Arkansas legislature to require that only women workers be paid
time-and-one-half their hourly rate for hours worked in excess of eight
in one day. The Hays court harmonized the women-only overtime pay
law with Title VII's requirement of sex equality in employment by ex-
tending the benefit of the law to male employees, rather than by taking
it away from female employees.
Implicit in Hays was the court's understanding that the Arkansas
legislature would have preferred such a result had it known that its
women-only overtime pay law would be invalidated because of its in-
consistency with Title VII.21 6 Shortly after the Hays decision, however,
the Arkansas Supreme Court, which as noted earlier is the final arbiter
of the meaning of Arkansas law, including the presumed intention of
208. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
209. Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971). But see text accom-
panying notes 234-37 infra, which argues that only those aspects of the law that had de-
prived women of equal job opportunities with men were struck down by Rosenfeld.
210. State v. Fairfield Communities Land Co., 260 Ark. 277, 538 S.W.2d 698, cert. de-
nied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1976).
211. Homemakers Inc. v. Division of Indus. Welfare, 509 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1063 (1976).
212. Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1971), rev'd on
other grounds, 474 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1972).
213. Id
214. 318 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
215. Hays v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 465 F.2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1972).
216. See id at 1083-84.
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the Arkansas legislature on the abrogation-extension issue, held in
State v. Faifield Communities Land Co.,21 7 that the Arkansas legisla-
ture had not intended to benefit men. Totally ignored by the Arkansas
court was the question impliedly resolved in Hays. That question was
not what the Arkansas legislature's original intention had been with
regard to covering men under the statute. The original intention was
clear from the fact that the statute covered women employees only.
Rather, the question to be resolved was what the Arkansas legislature
had intended--or would have intended had it thought about the mat-
ter-as to whether the benefits under the statute should be extended to
men or taken away from women, if the statute in its original form were
held to be unconstitutional or violative of a federal law because of its
benefited group's underinclusiveness.
Had the Arkansas court pursued that inquiry, it could reasonably
have concluded that the Arkansas legislature would have preferred the
extension of those benefits to male workers over their being taken away
from female workers. Among other reasons, the court could have con-
cluded that the 1915 Arkansas statute, 218 like the post-1908 protective
labor laws of many other states that applied to women workers only,
had not been applied by the legislature to men primarily because the
legislature had not believed that it could validly enact such a law to
benefit both sexes. This had been the message of the Lochner-Muller
sequence of United States Supreme Court decisions in 1905 and
1908.219 In Lochner, the New York legislature's efforts to enact hours-
limitation laws that would protect both men and women workers had
been invalidated by the Court as a violation of the liberty of contract
guarantee it found implicit in fourteenth amendment due process. But
in Muller, due process was held not to be violated by a law that limited
the working hours of women workers only. Many women-only protec-
tive laws were later enacted by the states220 despite any wishes their
legislatures, like the New York legislature in Lochner, might have had
to benefit both sexes. Although in 1917 the Court held in Bunting v.
Oregon221 that an hours limitation law for both sexes would be consti-
tutional, by then inertia and habit had kept many women-only protec-
tive laws unchanged and permitted other women-only laws to be
217. 260 Ark. 277, 538 S.W.2d 698, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1004 (1976).
218. See id at 278, 538 S.W.2d at 699.
219. See text accompanying notes 141-44 supra.
220. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-601 (1976), heldpreempted by Cipil Rights Act in
State v. Fairfield Communities Land Co., 260 Ark. 277, 538 S.W.2d 698 (1976); CAL. LAB.
CODE §§ 1251-1253 (West 1971) (repealed by Cal. Stat. 1976, ch. 1177, § 1, at 5274).
221. 243 U.S. 426 (1917).
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subsequently enacted.222
The historical genesis of many women-only protective labor laws,
the responsibility of courts to assess presumed legislative intention with
respect to invalidation or extension if a law is declared invalid because
of the underinclusiveness of the group it seeks to benefit, and the equal
intrusion into the legislative domain whether a court decides to invali-
date the law or to extend it to the excluded group, all suggest that the
result in Hays was more sound than the one reached by the Arkansas
Supreme Court in Faitqield Communities Land Co. 223 These considera-
tions also suggest that in the case of a daily overtime pay law or mini-
mum wage law for women only, the proper remedy is to extend the
benefit of the law to men rather than to take it away from women. In
the language of Westcolt, extension would be both simple and equita-
ble,224 since it would not deprive any woman employee of benefits she
had enjoyed under existing law. To the contrary, because of the dual
aspects of such laws, their extension to men would not only give men
the same benefits that had previously been enjoyed by women only, but
would also relieve women of the detrimental effects of such laws that
had previously burdened them.
Extension of such laws to men, it is submitted, would not be in-
equitable to employers, although extension might cost them more for
both overtime work and higher wages for men who had been earning
less than the state law's minimum wage for women. That such exten-
sion is reasonable is demonstrated by the government regulations that
222. By 1917 too many men had grown to depend on the availability of overtime work.
In the absence of an understanding about their dual aspect, the extension of such laws to
men would have burdened them with the inability to work overtime hours along with bene-
fiting them by permitting them to refuse to work overtime. See text following note 225 infra.
223. The result in Potlatch Forests, Inc. v. Hays, 318 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Ark. 1970),
aff'd, 465 F.2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1972), for the same reasons, also would appear to make more
sense than the decision of the Ninth Circuit in Homemakers Inc. v. Division of Indus. Wel-
fare, 509 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1064 (1976), which refused to extend
to men a state overtime wages and hours law applicable to women only, because it would
"usurp the legislative power vested exclusively in the state." Significantly, that extension to
men was subsequently effected by action of the California Legislature, CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 1173 (West Supp. 1980), and the California Industrial Welfare Commission Work Order
No. 1-80, 8 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 11180 (1979). The same timidity is reflected in the deci-
sion of the California Supreme Court in Arp v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 19 Cal. 3d
395, 563 P.2d 849, 138 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1977), which invalidated a workers' compensation
provision giving surviving widows of covered male employees greater death benefits than
was granted to surviving widowers of covered female employees who lost their lives in the
course of employment. Rather than extend these benefits to the surviving spouses of female
employees, however, the California court simply invalidated the provision, and left to the
legislature the task of restructuring death benefits under the statute.
224. See text accompanying note 206 supra.
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have for many years increased their cost of doing business. Also, the
effect of the Lochner-Muller sequence upon the enactment of such laws
suggests that employers had become the unintended beneficiaries of
these laws, to the extent they were not required to pay male workers the
same minimum wage or overtime pay as female workers. In addition,
the alternative to extending overtime and minimum wage benefits to
male workers is to take them away from women workers, that is, to
invalidate the law.22 5 Were this to be done, it would create another
windfall for employers who, until the law's invalidation for underinclu-
siveness, at least had been required to pay women workers the mini-
mum wage or overtime pay prescribed by the statutes. Finally, even
after the benefits of such laws were extended to men, employers could
still seek further restructuring of the laws by their respective legisla-
tures-although concededly the burden of disturbing the status quo
would then be on the employers rather than upon those who desired to
maintain the benefits for both sexes. 226
Extension to males of overtime pay or minimum wage laws that as
written apply to women only, rather than invalidation of these laws,
thus would appear to be the proper remedial course. There are two
types of women-only protective labor laws, however, that would pres-
ent special problems were they simply extended to male employees.
They are laws prohibiting employers from permitting or requiring wo-
men employees to work more than a given number of hours in a day
and laws prohibiting an employer from permitting or requiring women
employees to lift objects weighing more than a given number of
pounds, either repeatedly or on a single occasion, in the course and
scope of their employment.
Were employers who had been prohibited from permitting women
to work overtime now also to be prohibited from permitting men to
work overtime, as a result of the law's extension, two results would
ensue. Men, like women, would enjoy the benefits of such a law. If
they wished, they could safely refuse their employer's request or de-
mand that they work overtime. Like women, they would have more
time for pursuits beyond the work place. The problem, however, arises
because many men have grown to depend upon the opportunity to
work overtime as a means of making ends meet or of improving their
living standard. Also, many employers at times require some overtime
225. If an hours-limitation law is simply invalidated because it applies to women only,
women will lose the benefit of the law's truly protective aspects, ie., they can thereafter be
forced to work overtime like men.
226. See text following note 228 infra.
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work to be performed by their employees. Were the overtime prohibi-
tion simply extended to men, men would be deprived of the overtime-
pay opportunity, employers would be disabled from satisfying the
needs of their enterprise, and women who wished to work overtime to
maintain or improve their living standard would continue to be denied
that opportunity.
A similar problem results if a women-only weight-lifting restric-
tion is simply extended to men. If an absolute thirty-five pound limit
that applies to women is extended to men, for example, many objects
that have to be lifted in the course of employment will simply not be
lifted manually, although many individual men and women are capa-
ble of lifting such objects without harming themselves.
One obvious way to resolve the difficulties created by the statutory
or constitutional requirement of sex equality and the negative effects of
either invalidating or extending these laws is for the legislature that
enacted them to undertake the necessary restructuring to preserve the
benefits while simultaneously removing the burdens for both sexes.
This can be done in the area of hours-limitation laws by enacting the
principle of voluntary overtime. If employees of both sexes had the
right to work overtime, as well as the right to refuse to work overtime,
this goal could be met. In being permitted to work overtime, both men
and women could earn the income they need to maintain or improve
their living standard. In having the right to refuse to work overtime
without being punished by their employers, men and women workers
who wished to pursue family, personal, recreational, cultural, and edu-
cational interests, or simply rest, could do so. This solution has been
recognized in a proposed amendment to the federal Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act that is supported by the American Federation of Labor-Con-
gress of Industrial Organizations. 227
A weight-lifting restriction can be dealt with in a comparable man-
ner. A legislature can restructure the law so that it protects both sexes,
but does not completely hobble an employer who needs certain objects
weighing more than a specified weight lifted by its employees. Such a
solution is found in the Georgia rule promulgated by the Georgia
Commissioner of Labor, protecting both sexes, that provides: "Weights
of loads which are lifted or carried manually shall be limited so as to
avoid strains or undue fatigue. '228
227. H.R. 1784, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). See AFL-CIO News, October 27, 1979, at
1, col. 1.
228. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 233 (5th Cir. 1969) (quoting
Rule 69 promulgated pursuant to GA. CODE ANN. § 54-122(d) (1974)).
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Although legislative power to effect such change is undoubted, in-
voking legislative, as opposed to judicial, aid presents a major difficulty
because any person or group that seeks to have a legislature change the
status quo bears a heavy burden. The question then becomes upon
whom should that burden be cast. It is in the light of this problem that
the possibility of judicial restructuring of the laws assumes major im-
portance. It is true that regardless of how the courts resolve the ques-
tion of invalidation or extension, the legislature retains the last word.
Still, the problem of overcoming legislative inertia remains, making the
allocation of this burden crucial.
Westcott's implication that judicial restructuring of a legislative
scheme to cure its unconstitutionality (or invalidity under a statute) is
permissible if it can be done simply and equitably thus assumes special
importance. That a court can do this in remedying a state hours-limita-
tions or weight-lifting law that by its terms applies to women only is
illustrated by the 1971 decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacfc Co.22 9
In Rosenfeld, the defendant employer had refused to hire any wo-
men for a certain job because, among other reasons, the job required
the lifting of weights in excess of what California law permitted for
women, 230 and occasional work days of more than ten hours, which
another California law prohibited an employer from permitting or re-
quiring women employees to work.231 Finding that such laws were in-
consistent with Title VII's command of sex equality in employment, the
court concluded that the employer's policy was "not excusable under
...the state statutes" and upheld the judgment for the woman plain-
tiff who had been discriminated against because of her sex.232 Signifi-
cantly, however, the court added the following observation: "We leave
undecided the questions of this kind which may arise concerning the
varying employment policies of other employers under circumstances
unlike those of the present case. '233
What, then, was the precise effect and scope of the Rosenfeld deci-
sion? Although the court did not discuss the dual aspect of the laws in
question, its careful limitation of what it was deciding suggests that it
took into consideration, or at least was aware of, that dual aspect. One
effect of the hours- and weight-limitation laws in Rosenfeld was to deny
229. 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
230. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1250-1252 (West 1971) (repealed by Stats. 1976, ch. 1177, § 1).
231. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1350-1352.5 (West 1971) (amended by Stats. 1971, ch. 457, § 1).
232. 444 F.2d at 1227.
233. Id
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women equal employment opportunity with men. Another effect of the
hours-limitation law was to deny women the same opportunity as men
to earn overtime pay. These effects reflected the laws' burdensome or
detrimental aspects. As suggested earlier, those detrimental aspects can
be thought of as being embodied in separate and distinct statutes.234
Accordingly, the only issue confronting the Rosenfeld court was the va-
lidity of those detrimental aspects or, in other words, the validity of the
implied separate statutes embodying those detrimental aspects. The
court's ruling that the employer could not rely on those statutes to deny
the plaintiff the same job opportunity that it granted to men went only
that far and no further. The court itself acknowledged this narrow
scope when it limited its holding to the precise situation in the case.
After Rosenfeld was decided, had a California male employee
sought to have the beneficial aspect of the hours- or weight-limitation
laws, that is, the benefits of the implied separate statute applied to him,
nothing determined in Rosenfeld would have precluded the same court
from granting such relief. Having dealt only with the burdens of those
laws, Rosenfeld decided nothing about the beneficial aspects of those
laws or the implied laws embodying those separate aspects.
A court presented with a male employee seeking to have the bene-
fit of the hours-limitation law extended to him could well have decided
to grant the remedy for the reasons suggested in connection with the
extension of minimum wage and overtime pay laws: the distortion of
the original purpose of state legislatures to protect members of both
sexes against working unwanted overtime hours by the Lochner-Muller
sequence 235 and the fact that invalidation of the protective law is as
intrusive of legislative function as is the extension of its benefits to
men.236
A similar conclusion could be reached by a court if, following Ro-
senfeld, a male worker had sought to benefit from the weight-lifting
restriction that had previously applied to women workers only. His
claim of course would be that Rosenfeld had decided only that the
weight-lifting law could not be relied on by the employer as an excuse
for denying women equal job opportunities, that is, that Rosenfeld
dealt only with the law's detrimental aspects or with the implied sepa-
rate statute embodying those detrimental aspects. The case did not
hold that women employees could not continue to benefit from the im-
plied separate beneficial statute by being able to refuse with impunity
234. See text following note 141 supra.
235. See notes 142-49 & accompanying text supra.
236. See text accompanying notes 193-95 supra.
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to lift weights in excess of the maximum allowed by the statute, or that
those beneficial aspects could not be extended to men. Because a sim-
ple extension of the weight-lifting restriction to men could produce un-
foreseen hardships on employers by disabling them from requesting
any employee of either sex from lifting certain weights, extension of
that restriction, while simple, might not prove to be as equitable to all
concerned as would be a judicial restructuring of the weight-lifting stat-
ute. Were the court to restructure the statute so that it protected mem-
bers of both sexes from lifting weights which caused undue strain or
fatigue, as in the Georgia provision cited earlier,237 it would have re-
moved the detriment in Rosenfeld and preserved the benefit in this sub-
sequent case in a manner that can be seen to be both equitable and
simple.
In California, the locus of the Rosenfeld decision and of other
cases invalidating women-only protective labor laws for being inconsis-
tent with Title VII, the problem of remedial choice has been largely
mooted by subsequent state legislation and administrative agency ac-
tion that, by and large, has extended prior women-only benefits to men.
Thus, as a result of this legislative-administrative action, male employ-
ees in California are now equally entitled with women to the same min-
imum wage, to seats at work and periodic rest periods, and to
protection against lifting excessive weights.2 38 Significantly, however,
the California Industrial Welfare Commission has not promulgated
any new work orders limiting the working hours of either men or wo-
men workers. The Rosenfeld decision would thus appear to have had
the practical effect of depriving women workers of the hours-limitation
protection as well as relieving them of its burden, although the case
addressed only the burden aspect of those work orders. In large part,
this result may be explained by failure of the California legislature and
the state's Industrial Welfare Commission to understand the narrow
nature of the Rosenfeld holding.
Nevertheless, the analysis suggested above should give the Califor-
nia Industrial Welfare Commission and the California Legislature a
basis for re-evaluating their post-Rosenfeld treatment of the hours-limi-
tation question for both sexes. Furthermore, in those states that have
not dealt with the apparent judicial invalidation of hours or weight lift-
ing limitations, courts and legislatures can still restructure statutes or
237. See note 228 & accompanying text supra.
238. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1182 (West Supp. 1980) was amended in 1972 to apply to "em-
ployees" rather than to "women and minors" only. See Work Order No. 1-80 of California
Industrial Welfare Commission, 8 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 11180 (1979).
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rules embodying such limitations so as to make their truly beneficial
aspects apply to both sexes. Enactment at the state level of statutes
embodying the principle of voluntary overtime, as proposed for the
federal Fair Labor Standards Act,239 would be one way in which this
can be done. And in numerous other areas, aside from state protective
labor laws, the "restructuring 240 proposed herein is a technique that is
readily available.
Unfortunately, the technique of judicial, or even legislative, exten-
sion of the beneficial aspects of laws and invalidation of their detrimen-
tal aspects-whether applied in separate proceedings or in a single
proceeding, or treated as a simple extension or invalidation, or as an
equally simple restructuring-is not available for every law that has a
dual aspect. The obligation of compulsory military service, for exam-
ple, is, as has been shown, also a dual aspect law. The benefits military
service confers include job training at government expense, employ-
ment opportunity, and veterans' benefits ranging from preference for
government employment to educational and home-loan support under
the G.I. Bill of Rights. Its detriments are equally obvious. Persons in-
voluntarily inducted into the armed forces not only have their lives and
careers disrupted by being removed from family, friends, and civilian
jobs, but they face extraordinary risks of injury or death in the per-
formance of their military duties. There is no way, moreover, to elimi-
nate these detriments; they inhere in the nature of military service.241
For too long, the burden of compulsory military service has been
cast exclusively on the male members of our society. Thus far, the ex-
clusion of women from this civic duty has not been justified by the
courts as benign discrimination. Rather, the courts have upheld this
exclusion based on the prevailing constitutional tests under which sex
discrimination was assessed. All the cases upholding a male-only draft
against constitutional challenge242 were decided, however, before the
Craig intermediate test for gender discrimination had been promul-
239. See note 227 & accompanying text supra.
240. See note 196 supra.
241. For a variety of reasons it would be inappropriate for a court to extend the burden
of a statute to a group upon which it had not been originally cast by the legislature. As a
result, for the obligation of compulsory military service to survive constitutional challenge, it
must be made sex-neutral not by a court, but by Congress itself. The unwillingness of the
United States Supreme Court, in resolving equal protection challenges, to cast a burden
upon a group that had not originally been burdened by a legislature, can be seen in Police
Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
242. United States v. Reiser, 532 F.2d 673 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Camara, 451
F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Dorris, 319 F. Supp. 1308 (N.D. Ga. 1970);
United States v. Cook, 311 F. Supp. 618 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
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gated by the Supreme Court.243 It is doubtful that the male-only obli-
gation of compulsory military service can survive the Craig
intermediate test. The danger is that exclusion of women from the
draft, should a draft become necessary, will be sought to be justified as
benign discrimination.
To uphold exclusion of women from compulsory military service
on benign discrimination grounds would, for all the reasons examined
in the earlier sections of this Article, be erroneous. It would ignore the
effects of widespread societal and legal discrimination against males,
and the detrimental aspects, for women, of being excluded from the
draft. In this limited realm, however, there is no way to both preserve
the benefits and remove the burdens of the draft for both sexes. When
the draft becomes sex-neutral in its operation, the effect will necessarily
be to confer on both sexes the burdens as well as the benefits of com-
pulsory military service.
The development of a sex-neutral draft, as well as the abrogation
of the benign discrimination doctrine itself, which has been the princi-
pal corrective proposed herein, can have positive effects on the devel-
opment of constitutional principles affecting governmental sex
discrimination. While its impact on equal rights amendment ratifica-
tion is difficult to measure, it should influence Supreme Court decisions
in sex discrimination cases brought under existing constitutional provi-
sions. Abrogation of the benign discrimination doctrine should in-
crease the likelihood that a Court majority could be persuaded to treat
gender as a suspect classification. Even if this did not occur, it would
be much more difficult for the Court to find that any governmental
gender-based classification has passed the intermediate test of Craig.
In effect, if not in theory, the Craig intermediate test is likely always to
produce the same results as the overwhelming interest test that would
be applied were sex classification held to be suspect.
In sum, in the overwhelming majority of cases, abrogation of the
benign discrimination doctrine in the sex discrimination area would
not cause women to lose the benefits they now derive from laws that
are justified by that doctrine. Those benefits would simply be enjoyed
by men as well as women. At the same time, abrogating the benign
243. In what appears to be the latest case challenging the draft on constitutional grounds
before the Craig test was announced, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the
male-only draft in a one-paragraph opinion by simply asserting a "rational basis" for the
gender classification. United States v. Reiser, 532 F.2d 673 (9th Cir. 1976). Applying a
suspect classification analysis, the district court had held the male-only draft unconstitu-
tional. United States v. Reiser, 394 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Mont. 1975).
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discrimination doctrine would also remove from women the detrimen-
tal burdens imposed upon them by the laws that purport to discrimi-
nate in their favor. Above all, eliminating the benign discrimination
doctrine would signal a recognition of a major fact too long ignored-
that, as a result of centuries of sex-role sterotyping, men as well as wo-
men have been victimized by legal and social institutions.
Conclusion
In the decade of the 1970's, the United States Supreme Court
made giant strides in response to claims of unconstitutional sex-based
discrimination. Although the Court has not yet agreed to treat gender
classifications as suspect-a development devoutly to be desired-it
has subjected such classifications to the heightened level of scrutiny re-
quired by the Craig test.244 The practical effect of applying that test,
under which a gender classification will satisfy the equal protection
guarantee only if it can be shown to be substantially related to an im-
portant governmental interest, will be to invalidate practically all gen-
der classifications that would have satisfied the Court's former "any
rational basis" test in this area-all, that is, except those classifications
the Court finds to have been created for a benign or compensatory pur-
pose.
The benign discrimination exception to the Craig test has under-
mined the Court's basic human rights achievement in the sex discrimi-
nation decisions of the 1970's.245 Except for some contrary intimations
of a willingness to apply the benign discrimination exception to men in
244. See notes 11-15 & accompanying text supra.
245. In urging the abrogation of the benign discrimination doctrine in the gender bias
area, I do not intend to cast any doubt on the validity of laws like the Equal Pay Act of 1963,
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976), and Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (as amended). 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. 1I 1978). To be sure, those laws were enacted
primarily to assist female victims of past discrimination in the employment sphere. At first
glance, therefore, they would appear to violate the principle negatively implied by Washing-
ton v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256
(1979), namely, that a law, although phrased in sex-neutral terms, is unconstitutionally dis-
criminatory if it was intended to benefit one sex more than another and in fact had that
effect. But the Equal Pay Act and Title VII, despite their apparent intention primarily to
benefit women victims of past discrimination, do in fact benefit both sexes. Indeed, in nu-
merous cases male victims of employment discrimination have prevailed in their Equal Pay
Act or Title VII claims. See e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.
1971). Despite their primary intention, therefore, those Acts, by treating men and women
alike, avoid the dangers of a benign discriminatory law described earlier. They recognize
that men, as well as women, have been and continue to be victims of sex-based employment
discrimination. And they avoid burdening women with any detrimental aspects of those
laws that would be felt by them if those laws were not equally applicable to men.
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the Marshall-Brennan dissent in Feeney,246 the exception has been ap-
plied only in cases in which the classification appears to favor women.
As demonstrated in this Article, such classifications also inevitably dis-
favor women in important respects, because both sexes are not sought
to be benefited by the law in question.
The most important shortcoming of the Supreme Court's benign
discrimination doctrine in the area of gender bias has been the Court's
failure to understand the scope and extent of past and present official
discrimination against males. Not surprisingly, this shortcoming is
shared by many members of the public who have come to think of the
political and social movement for equal rights without regard to sex as
essentially a movement for women's rights.
Although the injustices perpetrated upon women by the American
social, political, economic and legal systems have been severe-indeed
outrageous247-men have been equally powerless victims of sex dis-
criminatory laws, official practices, and social mores. The heightened
level of scrutiny approved in Craig, to be applied where males allege
their victimization by a sex-discriminatory law, is implicit recognition
of this fact. The Court, however, has failed to face up to these implica-
tions of Craig.
The movement for equal rights without regard to sex is understood
by most of its participants as a movement for human rights. In their
efforts to achieve ratification of the proposed equal rights amendment
and to convince the Court to raise still higher the level of scrutiny ap-
plicable to gender classification under existing constitutional provi-
sions, equal rights advocates understand the fundamental goals of the
movement to be the ending of law-imposed sex-role stratification, and
not just of the sterotyping of women's roles. The right of all individu-
als, male or female, to realize their fullest potential as human beings,
without governmental interference resting on gender-based assump-
tions about their attributes, is what the equal rights movement is all
about.
The benign discrimination doctrine has been substantially nar-
rowed since it was first formulated in Kahn v. Shevin.248 Wiesenfeld 249
246. See notes 116-22 & accompanying text supra.
247. See KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW, supra note 10.
248. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
249. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). See notes 35-41 & accompanying
text supra.
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and Goldfarb250 make it clear that the "benign" purpose must have
been behind the statute at the outset; otherwise the doctrine will not be
applied. Orr2 5 ' represents a further retrenchment: if the benign pur-
pose can be achieved without a benign preference, L e., by individual-
ized hearings, the doctrine will not apply, and if the benign purpose is
not designed to compensate for past discrimination "within the sphere"
of the benignly discriminatory statute or rule, a further reason exists for
not applying the doctrine.
Although the Court has narrowed the circumstances under which
it will apply the benign discrimination doctrine, it has not repudiated it,
and the doctrine undoubtedly still has a substantial field in which to
operate. If the Court entirely abrogates the benign discrimination doc-
trine in the gender bias area, as proposed herein, most of the truly ben-
eficial aspects of benignly discriminatory laws (which also have
detrimental aspects) can be preserved for women by various judicial
techniques. Even if the courts fail in individual cases to invoke such
techniques, and instead invalidate benignly discriminatory laws in their
entirety, legislatures can still restructure such laws in ways that will
confer their beneficial aspects on both sexes. In most cases, judicial or
legislative extension of benefits to the gender previously excluded from
sharing in these benefits will in itself remove the law's detrimental as-
pects, or at least its most detrimental features.
Finally, it is to be hoped that, for the reasons advanced herein, the
Court will soon come to understand that the benign discrimination
doctrine in the gender bias area is an illusion, that it is inconsistent
with, and undermines, the Court's positive achievements elsewhere in
recent sex discrimination cases, that it reflects an inadequate .under-
standing of the political and social striving for equality without regard
to sex, and that the doctrine should be repudiated in its entirety.
250. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977). See notes 42-45 & accompanying text
supra.
251. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979). See notes 46-57 & accompanying text supra.
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